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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Divorce-Substituted Service of Summons-Suggested
Statutory Reforms
A recent North Carolina case' reveals certain undesirable aspects of
our procedural divorce law, particularly the service of summons by publication in divorce cases, which, it is believed, might well be corrected.
Plaintiff brought an action for divorce on grounds of two years'

separation in the Superior Court of Martin County. At the time, plain' Smith v. Smith, 226 N. C. 506, 39 S.E. (2d) 391 (1946). Criticisms in this note
are definitely not directed at the granting of the divorce decree on its merits. Rather
they are directed at the process by which jurisdiction was obtained. Whatever the
particular merits of the case, it is felt that such process is definitely not sufficient
in cases where the serious question of the advisability of destroying the marital
relationship is under consideration.
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tiff was a resident of Hertford County and his wife was a non-resident
of the state. They had never lived together in either Martin or Hertford County, having been residents of Warren County until the time of
their separation two years before. An order for service of summons by
publication was issued by the clerk of court based upon an affidavit of
the plaintiff which conformed to the essential statutory requirement 2 in
that it specified that "after due diligence . . . [the defendant] cannot
be found within the State of North Carolina." The order directed that
"summons be served by publication in some newspaper published in
Martin County as required by law." Notice of the summons was published in due conformity to the statutory requirements 3 in The Enterprise, a newspaper published in Williamston, Martin County. The
defendant failed to make appearance. After the submission of issues
to the jury, a decree of absolute divorce was entered on the verdict
rendered. Plaintiff died some five months later; and seven months
after his death defendant appeared by motion in the cause to have the
decree set aside. At that time the court, on motion of the plaintiff's
executor) allowed an amendment nun pro tune of the original order by
inserting the name of the newspaper therein. Defendant alleged no
actual notice of the pending action. The attack on the validity of
process was directed primarily at showing that the statutory requirement that, "The order must direct the publication in one or more newspapers to be designated as most likely to give notice to the person to
be served . . . "4 had not been complied with (italics ours). Defendant
contended that this clause of the statute makes mandatory a specific
recitation in the clerk's order that the newspaper to be used is the one
most likely to give notice. Defendant further argued that the clerk obviously could not have made such a recitation in this order, because the
newspaper was published in a locality one hundred miles from Warren
County where defendant's North Carolina residence had been, and defendant had no contacts in the locality where publication was made.
Defendant contended that this constituted such a defect in the service
of summons as to justify setting aside the decree. Held: G. S. 1-99
does not specifically require that an order for the publication of notice
of summons state that the newspaper is the one "most likely to give
notice to the person to be served." The court, citing one previous
North Carolina case, 5 based this construction of the statute on the
proposition that when an order for publication of notice of summons
is made by a court of record, there is a presumption of the rightfulness
of its decrees and that the newspaper specified is the one most likely
to give notice.
IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-99.
2N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-98.
'Ibid.
5
Elias v. Comm'r's. of Buncombe, 198 N. C. 733, 153 S. E. 323 (1930).

[Vol.25
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The upshot of this construction of G. S. 1-99 is that insofar as a
defendant who has had no actual notice via the publication is concerned,
the legislature might as well have omitted the phrase, "to be designated
194

as most likely to give notice

. .

.

,"

from the statute. The words may

serve to bring the legislative mandate to the clerk's attention, but if he
fails to obey the mandate, as it appears he did in the principal case, his
failure is not subject to attack by the prejudiced defendant. A New
York provision6 is not so dissimilar from our G. S. 1-99 as to demand an
exactly opposite construction; but that is just what occurred in that
jurisdiction. The pertinent phraseology of that statute, "The order ...
must direct that such service be made by publication thereof in two
newspapers. . ., designated in the order as most likely to give notice to
the defendant to be served...

,"

was construed by a New York supreme

court to require that the order expressly provide that the newspapers
are the ones most likely to give notice; and the court held that failure
to do so constituted a fatal defect in process. The court also pointed out
that the newspapers named in the order attacked were obviously not
7
papers most likely to give notice, also a fatal defect.

The construction announced by our court leads to an incongruous
result when it is considered that for defects in service by publication
less serious to the defendant, our court is quick to set aside the decree
of divorce. Thus, where the plaintiff's affidavit alleged that his wife
was a non-resident of the state, or that she was keeping herself concealed within the state, but failed to allege that "after due diligence the
defendant cannot be found within the State of North Carolina," the
court set aside the decree. 8 In another divorce case where the summons, as published, stated that the action was pending in a different
county from the one in which it was actually pending, but did require
the defendant to appear at the office of the clerk of the court. of the
correct county, the decree was set aside.9 Again, where the affidavit
set forth that a summons had been issued to the sheriff and had been
returned indorsed: "The defendant, .

. . ,

cannot, after due diligence,

be found in Mecklenburg County or in the State of North Carolina";
and further specified that the plaintiff, after due diligence, had been unable to locate the defendant and her whereabouts were unknown to the
plaintiff; the court set aside the decree because the affidavit, outside
the quoted sheriff's indorsement, failed to make the essential recitation.9 '
Can it be seriously contended that a defendant is more prejudiced by the
above noted defects in process than he would be by the fact that the
IN. Y. RuLEs oF CIVIL PRACTiCE, Rule 50.
Glinski v.
225130N.S.Y.E.Supp.
505 (1927).
'Fowler
v. Glinski,
Fowler, 131
190 Misc.
N. C. 1,
536,
315 (1925).
' Guerin v. Guerin, 208 N. C. 457, 181 S. E. 274 (1935).

" Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 224 N. C. 275, 29 S. E. (2d) 901 (1944).
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publication was made in a newspaper which had only the remotest possibility of ever conveying notice to him?
The opportunity for taking advantage of this loophole in the procedural safeguards incident to divorce actions is enhanced by another
statute. As pointed out by the court in the principal case, G. S. 50-3,
which provides that in proceedings for divorce the summons shall be

returnable to the court of the county in which either plaintiff or def endant resides, is not jurisdictional, but relates to venue, and may be waived

by failure of the defendant to demand in writing before answering that
the trial be had in the proper county. This statute then provides a
perfect inducement to a plaintiff seeking a divorce to institute proceedings in a county where the newspaper used for publication is definitely
not likely to give actual notice, knowing that these facts alone will not
subject the proceedings to possible invalidation.10
It is realized that everything said to -this point is as applicable to
other actions where service is allowed by publication as it is to divorce
actions. However, it is believed that on grounds both of public policy
and of the legal considerations involved, criticism of the state of our
law on this subject is especially pertinent to divorce actions. It is perhaps trite to say that every thinking citizen is appalled by the number
of divorce decrees now granted by our courts, and at the apparent ease
with which they are obtained. Our recently much-publicized "divorce
mill"" verifies the justification for this feeling. The high proportion
of divorce actions where service is made by publication may perhaps
partially explain the large number of decrees granted.' 2 Is it illogical
to suppose that the statutory defects noted may be conducive to the
10 It is gratifying to learn from a superior court clerk that some of our superior
court judges, taking cognizance of these abuses possible under G. S. 50-3, are refusing to try divorce actions where the plaintiff is a non-resident of the county
where the action is instituted, if the service has been made by publication. This
procedure by the judges is commendable as preventing the abuses noted, but at least
one authority has questioned the legality of such action by a judge without demand
by the defendant. MclNTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRAcCE AND PROCEDURE (1929
ed.) §295.
. Burke Davis, Divorce, Charlotte News, Nov. 18, 1946; Nov. 19, 1946; Nov.

20, 1946.
2

" Upon written inquiry to the clerks of the superior courts, the following excerpts from letters received in reply from three geographically representative
counties should serve as a fairly accurate cross-section view: (1) ". . . within the
last three years the average yearly divorces exceed 200 in number. I would say
that at least 50 per cent of these are cases in which the defendant is served by publication of summons." (2) "We average around 350 divorce cases in this county
each year. Of this number, perhaps one-half are served by publication on the defendants who are alleged not to be residents, of the State of North Carolina or of
[this] county." (3) "During the year 1943 there were two hundred ninety-one
(291) divorce cases tried in [this] county. In 1944 there were three hundred
twenty-three (323), in 1945 there were four hundred sixty-eight (468) and while
I do not have the complete record for 1946, there has been a sharp increase in the
I estimate that service of summons' is made by publication
divorces granted ....
in thirty per cent (30%) of these cases."
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widespread practice of making service by publication in these actions?
Would not more contested divorces lower the number of decrees granted?
If our procedure were tightened up, parties might think more seriously
before entering into the marital relationship in the first place.
These features of our procedural divorce law are also susceptible to
criticism on a purely legal basis. Our statute, G. S. 1-98, makes no distinction between the procedure to be employed in obtaining service by
publication in divorce actions and in the other types of action where it
is allowed; they are all listed together, all to be governed by the same
procedure outlined in G. S. 1-99. The classification of these actions is
made on the basis that they are all actions in rem or quasi in rem, where
this form of substituted service constitutes due process of law; as distinguished from in personam actions where it does not, the defendant
being a non-resident of the state. To bring divorce actions within this
classification, the questionable doctrine of considering the marriage relationship itself the res, is invoked. The idea then is that over this
relationship the state has control, and may dissolve it even where one
of the two parties concerned has not been actually notified of the pending proceedings. The inclusion of divorce actions within this classification leads to certain incongruities which are strikingly presented by Mr.
Justice Jackson, dissenting in the famous case of Willianms v. North
Carolina3 on its first trip to the Supreme Court of the United States.
One of the results, he says, is that, ". . . settled family relationships
may be destroyed by a procedure that we would not recognize if the
suit were one to collect a grocery bill." Justice Jackson proceeds to
question the advisability of allowing any form of substituted service in
divorce actions. Admitting, however, that they must be allowed to
prevent a party who is guilty of conduct which would justify a divorce
in North Carolina from going to a state where it would not, and thus
evading our law, 14 this criticism of the whole doctrine should serve to
indicate that divorce actions are not of the same nature as the other
actions with which they are classified. Certainly they are entitled to
special consideration in this respect, even if they are allowed to remain
in the general classification of actions where service by publication may
be made. This special consideration should take form in such stringent
safeguarding, by statutes and judicial construction, of the whole substituted service process in divorce actions as to insure the best chance
possible of giving actual notice to the defendant. In North Carolina,
statutes and judicial construction of these statutes do not afford these
safeguards. It would certainly appear that personal service on a de1' 317 U. S. 287, 316 (1942). This case, in all its stages, is discussed at length
in Baer, So Your Client Wants a Divorce! (1945) 24 N. C.L. REv. 1.
14 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 735 (1877).
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fendant, whose residence out of state is known, by an officer of the
county of his out of state residence, is a device more apt to give actual
notice than is service by publication. Yet our statute' 5 which provides
for such service states that it may be used in lieu of publication; and the
statute has been construed to mean that this form is optional and not
exclusive of service by publication in newspapers. 16 Why, if it is consonant with our conception of natural justice that a defendant should
have actual notice if at all possible, should not this more certain form be
employed exclusively when available?
To summarize the state of our law on the subject of substituted
service of summons in divorce actions: Service by publication, the most
haphazard method, is elevated to a position of equality with a more certain form by G. S. 1-104. G. S. 50-3 makes it possible for a plaintiff
to bring his action for divorce in any county, subject only to the defendant's demand in writing that it be removed to another county before
answering.' 7 This demand will probably not be forthcoming if service
is made by publication in a newspaper of the county where the action
is commenced and that county is one wherein the absent defendant has
no contact with persons who might see the notice. The fact that publication is made in a newspaper which had only the barest mathematical
chance of giving actual notice to the defendant is not a basis for attack
on the validity of a decree rendered in the action, due to our court's
construction of G. S. 1-99 in the principal case.
In order to eliminate these defects, it is submitted that North Carolina should pass legislation designed to provide an entirely separate procedure for substituted service of summons in divorce actions. Such
legislation should have two main objectives: First, to make service by
publication strictly a last-resort process; and second, to insure, insofar
as is possible, that when publication is used it has the best chance possible of giving actual notice.
A review of the statutes of all the states revealed one state which,
it is believed, has legislation more nearly capable than any other of
achieving the first objective. The Colorado Statutes' 8 provide in sub"IN.
C. GaIr. STAT. (1943) §1-104.
18
Mullen v. Norfolk & Carolina Canal Co., 114 N. C. 8, 19 S.E. 106 (1894).
And possibly by the court ex 2nero motu, see note 10 supra.
COLORADO STATuTES AxnoTATED (1935) c. 56, §§4 and 5.
Section 4: "In every action for divorce, except where defendant is without the
United States, personal service of the summons and a copy of the complaint shall be
made on the defendant, except as provided in the next succeeding section, or as
hereafter provided. If such service be made within the state of Colorado, then the
defendant shall have thirty days thereafter within which to plead to said complaint;
if the defendant is not within the state of Colorado, then personal service of the
summons and a copy of the complaint may be made by the sheriff of the county
in any state in which such defendant is found, or by a United States marshal if
the defendant is found in a United States territory or district, and the return of
such officer showing such personal service shall be held sufficient service to give
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stance: (1) That in every action for divorce, except where the defendant
is without the United States, personal service of the summons and a
copy of the complaint shall be made on the defendant, except as hereafter provided. (The form for return of summons specified in our
G. S. 1-104 might very well be incorporated in this section.) (2) When
it is ascertained that personal service is absolutely impossible, then, and
then only will service by publication be ordered. This is ascertained
from an affidavit by the plaintiff showing in detail aill the efforts made
by plaintiff to procure personal service, and all the facts which plaintiff
has of defendant's location, and all the facts within plaintiff's knowledge
which might help in locating defendant; and from a personal examination of the plaintiff relative to these facts by the court or judge in vacation. (The Colorado courts, in construing earlier similar statutes, have
insisted upon a strict compliance with all of the requirements therein,
and demand that such compliance be made a matter of record, parol
evidence being inadmissible to prove it.) 19
To attain the second objective, a statute such as follows is suggested,
such statute to immediately succeed those modeled after the Colorado
statutes: In every action for divorce where service of summons by
publication is ordered the order shall direct the publication in one or
two newspapers of general circulation in the county where it or they
are published; and the order shall contain an express statement that
the court jurisdiction of such defendant; and in case of such service outside of the
state of Colorado the defendant shall have fifty days from the date of such service
within which to plead to such complaint, and in all cases the time within which the
defendant must appear and plead shall be stated in the summons. Service of summons by a sheriff may be made through an undersheriff, or deputy sheriff in the
name of the sheriff, and service by a United States marshal may be made through
a deputy marshal in the name of the marshal. If the defendant is without the
United States such defendant shall be served by publication in the manner provided in the next succeeding section."
Section 5: "In any case where the defendant is without the state of Colorado
and his or her location is unknown to the plaintiff, or where the defendant conceals
himself or herself in Colorado so that summons cannot be personally served on him
or her, or where the plaintiff has no knowledge or notice, direct or indirect, of
where the defendant can be found, within or without the state of Colorado, the

palintiff may make an application to the court for an order to make service of the
summons on the defendant by publication; such application shall be made under oath
and shall state fully and in detail all of the efforts made by the plaintiff to procure
personal service of the summons on the defendant, and all of the knowledge of the
plaintiff concerning the location of the defendant and shall state all the facts within
the knowledge of the plaintiff which might assist in learning the address of the
defendant. The court, or the judge thereof, in vacation, shall, upon the hearing of
said application, carefully examine the plaintiff and such other witnesses as shall
be produced, in order to determine what steps shall be taken to notify such absent
defendant of the pendency of the action. The court or the judge thereof shall, if
satisfied of the good faith of the plaintiff cause the summons to be published in
the same manner and with like effect as is now provided by law for publication of
summons in cases of attachment." (This last sentence, for our purposes, should
read, ". . . cause the summons to be published as provided in the next succeeding
section.")
"'Roberts v. Roberts, 3 Colo. App. 6, 31 Pac. 941 (1892).

19471

NOTES AND COMMENTS

the newspaper or newspapers specified therein have been determined
from the application and examination required by law to be that or
those most likely to give notice to the person to be served. Provided;
that if it be shown that such statement did not appear in said order,
or that the information given in the application and examination required by the immediately preceding section was so false and misleading as to cause the newspaper or newspapers specified not to be
that or those most likely to give notice to the person to be served, or
that from the information given in such application and examination
the newspaper or newspapers specified could not reasonably have been
determined to be those most likely to give such notice, then the service
of summons is to be void and of no effect. 20
J. DICKSON PHILLIPs, JR.
Evidence-Opinion Rule-Estimate of Speed from Mark on Road
In Tyndall v. Hines Co.1 plaintiff was struck by defendant's truck
while walking on the shoulder of the road. A highway patrolman testified as to the presence of marks on the grass and shoulder. He testified
that they were not brake marks, but were marks made when the truck
made a sudden turn, thus shifting the weight to one side or the other.
The trial court allowed him to give his opinion as to tle speed of the
vehicle, based upon such physical data. On appeal, questioning the
admissibility of the evidence and alleging its admission was prejudicial
to the defendant, the Supreme Court Held: That the witness not having
seen the truck in motion would not be permitted to give an opinion as
to its speed. "The opinion must be of facts observed. The witness
must speak of facts within his knowledge. He cannot under the guise
of an opinion give his deductive conclusion from what he saw and
knew. '
Finding the evidence prejudicial, the court awarded the defendant a new trial.
Instances where the court will allow the witness to express himself
in terms of inferences drawn from facts observed may be divided in
two classes, which are subject to separate and distinct rules of admissibility: (1) Where the witness is specially qualified and by virtue of
such may aid the jury. (2) Where the witness is unable otherwise to
present the facts to the jury.3 The former which is most commonly
characterized as expert opinion is received because the witness' skill in
"' The provisions for length and cost of publication could be inserted after the
portion set out above.

* 226 N. C. 620, 39 S. E. (2d) 828
*Id. at 623, 39 S. E. (2d) at 830.

(1940).

* It is recognized that these classifications are but broad general divisions of

admissible opinion, and that there are some admissible opinions that cannot be easily
)laced in one or the other class but exist in the twilight zone of both.
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drawing the proper inference from the observed or assumed facts is
greater than the jury's; while the latter is a rule of necessity or convenience adopted to provide for the situation where the facts cannot be
so told by the witness as to make the jury as able as he to draw the
proper inference. 4
Though the opinion is one that is inadmissible from a witness not
specially qualified, if it be proper from one who is, an objection that
the witness is not specially qualified must be taken at the trial;5 and
when this is not done it is too late upon appeal to object that the witness
did not qualify as an expert. 6 Whether a particular witness is an expert
or not is a preliminary question of fact to be determined by the court
below. 7 That once determined, as it necessarily is determined, if the
testimony is admitted, the appellate court ordinarily accepts the lower

court's determination. 8 It follows that where an opinion is admitted
without objection as to the special qualifications of the witness the
appellate court should test the competency of the evidence according to
the rules applicable to both classes of opinion mentioned above.
Was the opinion in the principal case competent because the witness
was unable otherwise to present the facts to the jury? The observation
by the court that: "He (the witness) gave a plain, clear, and distinct
description of, the signs, marks, and conditions he found at the scene
of the collision so that ordinary jurymen could readily understand and
appreciate just what he saw," would indicate the statement as to the
speed of the truck, based upon these observations, was not admissible
as this class of opinion. The opinion here was not a substitute method
of presenting the facts observed, but was an inference or conclusion
drawn from them.
Was the evidence competent as expert opinion? The failure to
state the question calling for the opinion in hypothetical form would
not be objectionable, where the expert is speaking from personal observations. 9 Since the requirement that the witness be shown to be better
'WIGMOan, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §§557, 1917; STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA
EVImENCE (1946 ed.) §132.
5
Summerlin v. Railroad, 133 N. C. 550, 45 S. E. 898 (1903) ; Britt v. North

Carolina R. R., 148 N. C. 37, 61 S. E. 601 (1908) ; but see Bivings v. Gosnell, 141
N. C. 341, 53 S. E. 861 (1906).
6 State v. Corriher, 196 N. C. 397, 145 S. E. 773 (1928) ; Ramsey v. Standard
Oil Co., 186 N. C. 739, 120 S. E. 331 (1923); Vann v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.,
182 N. C. 567, 109 S. E. 556 (1921).
7LaVecchia v. Land Bank, 218 N. C. 35, 9 S. E. (2d) 489 (1940); State v.
Cafer, 205 N. C. 653, 172 S. E. 176 (1934) ; State v. Combs, 200 N. C. 671 158
S. E. 252 (1931); State v. Cole, 94 N. C. 958 (1886). But cf. Pridgen r. Gibson,
194 N. C. 289, 139 S. E. 443 (1927) (a finding by the trial court as a matter of law
that a witness was not an expert was reviewed and reversed).
' State v. Gray, 180 N. C. 697, 104 S. E. 647 (1920) ; Jones v. Norfolk Southern
R. R., 176 N. C. 260, 97 S. E. 48 (1916) ; Lumber Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.,
151 N. C. 217, 65 S. E. 920 (1909).
'Dulin v. Henderson-Gilmer Co., 192 N. C. 638, 135 S. E. 614, 49 A. L. R. 663
(1926) ; WIGmopE, EvmENcE (3rd ed. 1940) §675; Anno 82 A. L. R. 1338 (1931).
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qualified than the jury to draw such an inference had been waived in
the principal case, the answer to the above question should depend on
whether any inference stronger than a remote speculative guess could
be drawn from the observed facts.10 Notwithstanding his qualifications,
even the expert must base his opinion upon data adequate to authorize
an opinion." The principle is well established that when an expert
gives an opinion based upon supposed facts the facts assumed must be
legally sufficient to support the opinion.' 2 The principle should be
equally applicable when the opinion is based on the personal observations of the witness. 13 Most courts recognize that an expert can base
an opinion as to the speed of a vehicle upon the length of brake skid
marks, if given the weight of the vehicle, condition of the tires and
other physical conditions. 14 Similarly experts given the weight, speed,
conditions of the road, and other pertinent physical conditions have been
allowed to state an opinion as to the distance within which a vehicle
could have been stopped. 15 Generally the courts have refused to allow
10
Everart v. Fischer, 75 Ore. 321, 147 Pac. 189 (1915); Reall v. Deirizzi, 127
W. Va. 662, 34 S. E. (2d) 253 (1945) ; WIGMopm, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §959;
compare McCarthy v. Souther, 83 N. H. 29, 137 AtI. 445 (1927) (fact that impact
broke handle on door basis for opinion of speed).
I Shams v. Saportas, 152 Fla. 48, 10 So. (2d) 715 (1942) (proper to exclude
opinion based upon two patrolmen's observations after the collision).
",Hobbs v. Union Pacific R. R., 62 Idaho 58, 108 P. (2d) 841 (1940) (error to
admit an opinion of an expert as to the speed of a train based alone on the distance
it had traveled after the collision) ; Bazeman v. State, 177 Md. 151, 9 A. (2d) 60
(1940) (error to admit opinion as to possible stopping of car, without stating condition of tires, surface of road, etc.) ; Bryant v. Stone, 178 N. C. 291, 100 S. E.
578 (1919) (proper to exclude opinion as to cause of boat overturning based upon
appearances next morning) ; Thomas v. Inland Motor Freight Co., 190 Wash. 428,
68 P. (2d) 603 (1937) (error to admit opinion that truck with adequate braking
power could have slowed sufficiently to have rounded curve, when the speed of the
truck was not shown); Boyd v. Virginian Ry., 123 W. Va. 47, 13 S. E. (2d) 273
(1941) (error to admit opinion as to possible stopping distance of train without
including speed as a part of the basic data).
"Union Bus Lines v. Maulder, 180 S. W. (2d) 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944)
(error to admit opinion of speed based alone on damaged condition of vehicles) ;
Hobbs v. Union Pacific R. R., cited supra note 12; Bryant v. Stone, cited supra
note 12; Shams v. Saportas, cited supra note 11.
"Jackson v. Vaughn, 204 Ala. 543, 66 So. 469 (1920); McKenney v. Winter-

steen, 122 Neb. 679, 241 N. W. 112 (1932) (expert had specially qualified himself
by experiments under the same physical conditions).

Contra: Young v. Swartz, 34

N. E. (2d) 795 (Ohio Ct. of App. 1941) ; Heidner v. Germschied, 41 S. D. 439, 171
N. W. 208 (1919) (witness was allowed to state opinion after he was shown to
know the kind of car, condition of roadbed, and length of skid mark) ; Rankin v.

Hughes, 161 S. W. (2d) 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) ; Luethe v. Schmidt-Gaertner
Co., 170 Wis. 590, 176 N. W. 63 (1920). In Savadow v. Keystone Transportation
Co., 241 App. Div. 161,271 N.Y. Supp. 293 (1934) the court held it reversible error

to exclude expert opinion that skid marks of length shown could not have been
made except by car exceeding the legal speed limit. Compare Cheek v. Brokerage

Co., 209 N. C. 569, 183 S. E. 729 (1936) where an opinion as to which side of the
center line an accident occurred based upon data observed after the collision was
excluded because it invaded the province df the jury.
" This is but an application of the same principle with variables and unknowns
changed. Berkowitz v. American River Gravel Co., 191 Cal. 195, 215 Pac. 675
(1923) ; Birdsong v. Meyers, 141 Kan. 140, 40 P. (2d) 430 (1935) ; State v. Gray,
180 N. C. 697, 104 S. E. 647 (1920).
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a witness to give an opinion as to the speed of a vehicle based alone on
its sound in motion,1 6 or the sound of a collision.' 7 However, the Missouri court has held it proper to allow an expert to give an opinion as
to the speed of an automobile based upon such data.' 8
No general determination can be made as to the minimum sufficiency
of data necessary to support an opinion. This question must be passed
upon first by the trial court in the light of the circumstances of each
case and is reviewable as a question of law. No case has been found
which upholds the admissibility of an opinion based upon data so scant
as that in the principal case.
Sometime in the future there may be developed a scientific technique
which can provide a method for the estimation of speed based upon data
even as meager as that used in the principal case. When this is done it
will be time enough to re-examine the rule of evidence which now
excludes such estimations.
CyRus F. LE.
Federal Jurisdiction-Removal of Suits Instituted in State Courts
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act
Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, hereinafter abbreviated as F. L. S. A., provides that employee suits for the recovery of
unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation "may be maintained
in any court of competent jurisdiction."' Section 24(8) of the Judicial
Code provides that regardless of diversity of citizenship or the sum in
controversy the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction
over "all suits ...

arising under any law regulating commerce." 2 Sec-

tion 28 of the Judicial Code provides that "Any suit of a civil nature
...arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States... of
which the district courts of the United States are given original jurisdiction ... may be removed by the defendant... to the district courts." 8
In Swettman et al. v. Remington Rand4 plaintiff employee brought

action to recover alleged overtime compensation, liquidated damages,
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under the F. L. S. A. Action was
removed from the state court in which it was commenced. Plaintiff
moves to remand on ground that Congress intended to amend the Re" Law v. Gallegher, 9 Harr. (Del.) 189, 197 At. 479 (1938); Challinor v.
Axton, 246 Ky. 76, 54 S.W. (2d) 600 (1932) ; Park v. Gandio, 286 Mich. 133, 281
N. W. 565 (1935) ; Lambach v. Colley, 283 Pa. 366, 129 Ad. 88 (1925).
17 Knache v. Pease Seed and Grain Co., 134 Neb. 130, 277 N. W. 798 (1938);
v. Soalfeld, 138 Neb. 876, 295 N. W. 901 (1941).
Mierendorf
8
Murphy v. Cole. 338 Mo. 13, 88 S.W. (2d) 1023 (1935).
152 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U. S. C. A. §216(b).
236 STAT. 1092 (1913), 28 U. S. C. A. §41(8).
'36 STAT. 1094 (1914), 28 U. S. C. A. §71.
'65 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Ill. 1946).
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moval Statute by excepting from the provisions thereof any case by
employees against their employers which arise under the F. L. S. A.
Held, motion denied. In a similar action the court in Young v. Arbyrd
Compress Co.6 granted the motion.
While it is well established that original jurisdiction of cases arising
under the F. L. S. A. is concurrent in both federal and state courts,.
the question whether an action once commenced in the state court may
be removed to a federal district court has been decided both ways as the
two principle cases illustrate. There are no decisions on the point by
either the Supreme Court or the circuit courts of appeal. 8 In Volume
65 of the Federal Supplement there are four cases denying a motion to
remand and five granting such a motion. 9
The confusion stems from the unfortunate wording of the Act providing that an employee's action "may be maintained0 in any court of
competent jurisdiction." While some of the early cases remanding the
suit to the state courts were decided on the ground that a suit does not
"arise under a law of the United States" within the meaning of the
Removal Statute unless the construction or effect of the law is in dispute;"1 i.e., no federal question presented, the more recent decisions
denying removal refute this view. 12 These latter decisions along with
' See note 3 supra.
'66 F. Supp. 241 (E. D. Mo. 1946).

' Robertson v. Argus Hosiery Mills, 121 F. (2d) 285 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941), cert.

denied, 314 U. S. 681 (1941); Hart v. Gregory, 218 N. C. 184, 10 S. E. (2d) 644

(1940).

'An appeal from an order remanding a suit to the state court in which it was
instituted is denied by the Removal Statute, 28 U. S. C. A. §71.
g Cases cited, note 13 infra.
1
oItalics author's.
Unreported decisions are not listed in this note. For a partial list see Swettinan et at. v. Remington Rand, 65 F. Supp. 940 (S. D. Ill. 1946).
Stewart v. Hickman, 36 F. Supp. 861 (W. D. Mo. 1941) (Reeves, J.), noted
(1941) 6 Mo. L. Rv. 519; 9 KAN. CiTy L. REv. 227; Kuligowski v. Hart, 43 F.
Supp. 207 (N. D. Ohio 1941) ; Phillips v. Pucci, 43 F. Supp. 253 (W. D. Mo. 1942)
(Reeves, J.), noted (1942) 9 U. OF CH. L. REv. 742; Booth v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 44 F. Supp. 451 (D. Neb. 1942) (in part only; also relies on construction
of the word "maintained," see note 13 infra) ; Brockway v. Long, 55 F. Supp. 79
(W. D. Mo. 1944) (Reeves, J.) ; Adams v. Long et al., 65 F. Supp. 310 (W. D. Mo.
1943 (Reeves, J.). This position is based upon Justice Cardozo's statement in
Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U. S. 109, 114 (1936) where he stated: "A
suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United States is not
necessarily, or for that reason alone, one arising under those laws, for a suit does
not so arise unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction, or effect of such a law, upon the determination
of which the result depends." An excellent discussion criticizing the application
of this rule in cases where the action arises only because of a right granted by a
federal law will be found in (1942) 9 U. OF Cai. L. REV. 742 commenting on the
rule's application in Phillipsv. Pucci, supra, and will not be dealt with here.
"Young v. Arbyrd Compress Co., 66 F. Supp. 241, 242 (E. D. Mo. 1946)
("Some of the cases hold that there is no real question involving interpretation of
a Federal Statute. With these we are not in accord. Unless the language of the
Fair Labor Standards Act -prevents removal, we think such cases would be removable as cases arising under a law regulating interstate commerce."). Brantley v.
Augusta Ice & Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. Ga. 1943).
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all the cases granting removal base their conclusions upon the judge's
13
interpretation of the word "maintained."
Two Supreme Court decisions 14 in another connection defined the
word: "To maintain a suit is to uphold, continue on foot and keep from
collapse a suit already begun."'15 These decisions have been heavily
relied on by district courts denying removal'0 despite the fact that in
neither case was the Supreme Court construing the word in relation to
an implied amendment of the Removal Statute. Judge Hulen in Young
" Decisions denying removal due to construction of word "maintained":
Wingate v. General Auto Parts Co., 40 F. Supp. 364 (W. D. Mo. 1941) (Otis,
J.), noted (1942) 55 HARv. L. REv. 541, 36 ILL. L. Rav. 787, (1941) 26 MINN. L.
REv. 134; Booth v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 44 F. Supp. 253 (D. Neb. 1942);
Duval v. Protes, 51 F. Supp. 967 (E. D. N. Y. 1943) (Campbell, J.); Brantley v.
Augusta Ice & Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. Ga. 1943) ; Sheridan v. Leitner
(S. D. N. Y. 1944) (Bondy, J.) (case reversed Sheridanv. Leitner, 44 N. Y. S. (2d)
570 (1943) and did not mention contra opinion of Judge Hulbert in McCarrigle v.
11 W. Forty Second St. Corp., 48 F. Supp. 710 (S. D. N. Y. 1942) upon which the
New York trial judge based his decision allowing removal) ; Steiner v. Pleasantville Construction, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 1011 (S. D. N. Y. 1944) (Goddard, J.); Tobin
v. Hercules Powder Co., 63 F. Supp. 434 (D. Del. 1945) ; Smith v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 209 (S. D. Iowa 1946) ; Wright v. Long et at., 65 F. Supp.
279 (IV. D. Mo. 1944) (Otis, J.) ; Apple v. Shulman Publications, Inc., 65 F. Supp.
677 (D. N. J. 1943) (Smith, J.) (no mention whatsoever made of Judge Fake's
strong often quoted dicta in favor of removal in Ricciardiv. Lazzara Baking Corp.,
32 F. Supp. 956 (D. N. J. 1940) ; Young v. Arbyrd Compress Co., 66 F. Supp. 241
(E. D. Mo. 1946); McLendon v. Beddingfield, 38 S. E. (2d) 66 (Ga. App. 1946).
Decisions granting removal:
Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Corp., 32 F. Supp. 956 (D. N. J. 1940) (really
dicta as case remanded due to failure of defendant to file removal petition within
time specified for filing answer by New Jersey statute); Owens v. Greenville NewsPiedmont Corp., 43 F. Supp. 785 (W. D. S. C. 1942) ; McCarrigle v. 11 W. Forty
Second St. Corp., 48 F. Supp. 710 (S. D. N. Y. 1942) (Hulbert, J.) ; Harris v.
Reno Oil Co., 48 F. Supp. 908 (N. D. Tex. 1943) ; Cox v. Gatliff Coal Co., 52 F.
Supp. 482 (E. D. Ky. 1943), noted (1944) 7 U. OF Dxv. L. J. 96 and 42 MIcH. L. REv.
1138, aff'd but question of removal not raised, 142 F. (2d) 876 (1944) ; Sonnesyn v.
Federal Cartridge Co., 54 F. Supp. 29 (D. Minn. 1944) (Joyce, J.), noted in (1945)
43 MicH. L. REv. 814; Koskala v. Butler Bros., 65 F. Supp. 276 (D. Minn. 1946)
(Donovan, J.) ; Johnson v. Butler Bros., 65 F. Supp. 277 (D. Minn. 1946) ; Ellems
v. Helmers, Inc. et al., 65 F. Supp. 566 (E. D. N. Y. 1944) (Abruzzo, J.) ("Whatever discretion there might be . . . lies with the court to whom the petition for
removal is presented."); Swettman et al. v. Remington Rand, 65 F. Supp. 940
(S. D. Ill. 1946) ; Mengel v. Ishee, 192 Miss. 366, 4 So. (2d) 878 (1941) ; Sheridan v. Leitner, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 570 (1943); re'd, Sheridan v. Leitner, 59 F.
Supp. 1011 (S. D. N. Y. 1944).
One case fits in neither category. Garner v. Mengel Co., 50 F. Supp. 794, 796
(W. D. Ky. 1943) (remanded because of the rule "that where the question of
remand is doubtful the doubt should be resolved in favor of remanding the action
to the state court"). Contra, Cox v. Gatliff Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 482, 485 (E. D.
Ky. 1943) (the rule "not applicable where decision upon motion to remand requires
interpretation of an act of Congress").
" Smallwood et al. v. Gallardo, 275 U. S. 56 (1927) (construction of 1927
amendment to act providing civil government for Puerto Rico which provided
"that no suit for purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax
imposed by the laws of Puerto Rico shall be maintained in the district court of
the United States for Puerto Rico." 48 U. S. C. A. §872) ; Moore Ice Cream Co.
v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373 (1933) (suit to recover taxes under statute authorizing
taxpayer to maintain a suit to recover tax, irrespective of protest. REv. AcT 1924
§1014. 43 STAT. 343). Neither involved any question pertaining to removal.
15 Smallwood et al. v. Gallardo, 275 U. S. 56, 61 (1927) ; Moore Ice Cream Co.
v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373. 377 (1933).
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v. Arbyrd Compress Co. states: "If we consider the definition of the
term given in Webster' 7 and the opinions of the Supreme Court, we
cannot give it such a restricted meaning as only 'to commence.' "",8
This point is partially parried by district courts allowing removal by
citing 36 Corpus Juris 33610 containing decisions "holding that maintained is synonymous with 'commenced.' In fact so many different and
conflicting constrictions appear to have been given the word... that its
character for exactitude of meaning is badly damaged." 20
Another way of arguing that maintain means to uphold, etc., is to
state that since the state courts, in the absence of an express prohibition
by Congress, are already courts of competent jurisdiction wherein the
suit could be commenced, the use of "maintained" is meaningless unless
it be interpreted to mean "carried through to final judgment." 2'
However, Judge Briggle believes that Congress meant by Section 16(b) not
to fix the place where the suit might be brought but to provide who
might bring it.22 Thus he concludes "A construction denying removal
"aBooth v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 44 F. Supp. 451 (D.Neb. 1942) ; Garner
v. Mengel Co., 50 F. Supp. 794 (W. D. Ky. 1943); Brantley v. Augusta Ice &
Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 158 (S.D. Ga. 1943); Sheridan v. Leitner, 59 F. Supp.
1011 (S.D. N. Y. 1944); Steiner v. Pleasantville Construction, Inc., 59 F. Supp.
1011 (S.D. N. Y. 1944); Young v. Arbyrd Compress Co., 66 F. Supp. 241 (E.D.
Mo. 1946).
" Young v. Arbyrd Compress Co., 66 F. Supp. 241, 242 (E.D. Mo. 1946)
("To continue or persevere in or with; to carry on; as to maintain an attack, a
correspondence, a legal action.").
Id. at 243.
For many other conflicting definitions of the word "maintained" see 26
WoRDs &PHRusEs, Paam. ED. 58 to 60, and 1946 Sum,'. 8 to 10. See also (1942)
14 Miss. L. J. 157.
" Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Corp., 32 F. Supp. 956, 958 (D.N. J. 1940).
"This was the first point plaintiff relied on in support of his motion to remand in Swettman v. Remington Rand, cited supra note 4. This view was adopted
in: Wingate v. General Auto Parts Co., 40 F. Supp. 364 (W. D. Mo. 1941) ; Fredman v. Foley Bros., 50 F. Supp. 161 (W. D. Mo. 1943) ; Brantley v. Augusta Ice

& Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 158 (S.D. Ga. 1943) ; Sheridan v. Leitner, 59 F. Supp.
1011 (S.D. N. Y. 1944); Smith v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 209

(S.D. Iowa 1946) ; Young v. Arbyrd Compress Co., 66 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Mo.
1946). Contra: Cox v. Gatliff Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 482, 484 (E.D. Ky. 1943)
("Argument ...is not impressive." Judge Ford states that since the Act provides
for recovery not only of unpaid wages hut also an additional equal amount plus
reasonable attorneys' fees and Section 256 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. A.
§371, vests exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of the United States "of all suits
for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States" "it was
obviously the purpose of Congress to dissipate any doubts as to the right and
duty of state courts to entertain jurisdiction of suits arising under the Act, even
though the extra recovery authorized should be judicially determined to be in the
nature of a penalty or forfeiture within the meaning of Section 256 of the Judicial
Code:'). While this allowance under the Act for extra recovery was construed
in Robertson v. Argus Hosiery Mills, 121 F. (2d) 285 (C.C. A. 6th, 1941) not
to be a penalty, see Mengel Co. v. Ishee, 192 Miss. 366, 4 So. (2d) 878 (1941),
where the dissenting judge entertained just such a fear. See also (1941) 19 N. C.
L. REv. 251, 258.
" Swettman et a[. v. Remington Rand, 65 F. Supp. 940, 944 (S.D. fI1. 1946)
("From such examination of the legislative history and from an examination of
the Statute as finally enacted it is not reasonable to suppose that Congress had
any intention of amending the Removal Act. A reading of the entire Section 16 (b)
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gives undue prominence to the word 'maintained' and accords to it a
strained meaning not intended by the lawmakers and requiring an implied amendment of the Removal Act. I conclude that the Fair Labor
Standards Act neither amends the Removal Act nor excepts therefrom
cases arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act."m
A supporting point advanced in Young v Arbyrd Compress Co. is
that the "trend of recent decisions is to reduce federal jurisdiction by a
24
strict construction of the Removal Statute.
A collateral point used in granting removal by way of rebuttal to the
above is that Congress has specifically amended the Removal Apt2" when
such action was the Congressional intent.
Congressional intent to aid the employees by passage of the F. L. S. A.
is invoked by district courts denying removal on the basis that employee
interest is best served if cases are completely disposed of in conveniently
located state courts. 26 The court in the Swettman case, however, after
carefully considering the legislative history of the Act states: "Nothing
clearly shows that in inserting this section Congress was not intending to fix the
place where such a suit could be brought or prosecuted to a final judgment but was
concerned only with providing who might prosecute the suit and in what name the
suit would be brought.). See note (1941) 19 N. C. L. REv. 251 for a discussion
of the legislative history of the Act.
"Swettman et a[. v. Remington Rand, 65 F. Supp. 940, 944 (S. D. Ill. 1946).
"4 See also Brantley v. Augusta Ice & Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. Ga.
1943). But see Swettman et al. v. Remington Rand, 65 F. Supp. 940, 943 (S. D. Ill.
1946) ("It must be conceded [that such a policy to limit jurisdiction] set forth
sound reasons why perhaps Congress should have excepted these cases from the
Removal
Act. But the question . .. is solely what Congress did actually do.").
5
Federal Employers Liability Act, 52 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U. S. C. A. §56
provides: "The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States . . . shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States and no case arising under this
chapter and brought in any State court ... shall be removed to any court of the
United States." Removal Statute was also amended to conform. This viewpoint
adopted in: Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Corp., 32 F. Supp. 956 (D. N. J. 1940);
Owens v. Greenville News-Piedmont Corp., 43 F. Supp. 785 (W. D. S. C. 1942);
Cox v. Gatliff Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 482 (E. D. Ky. 1943); Sonnesyn v. Federal
Cartridge Co., 54 F. Supp. 29 (D. Minn. 1944); Swettman et al. v. Remington
Rand, 65 F. Supp.-940, 942 (S. D. Ill. 1946) ("In the past, in every case it has
been the policy of Congress when it intended to amend or make exceptions to the
Removal Act to do so by express words ....
There is no apparent reason why
Congress should -have adopted a new and different course in the passage of the
Fair Labor Standards Act if it intended to preclude removal of cases under that
Act."). Contra: Fredman Bros., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 161, 163 (W. D. Mo. 1943)
("But Congress is bound by no formula. If the meaning is clear.... ."). But see
Young & Jones v. Hiawatha Gin & Mfg. Co., 17 F. (2d) 193, 195 (S. D. Miss.
1927). For decision on the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. A. §688 see Beckwith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 66 F. Supp. 353 (N. D. Cal. 1946).
" Wingate v. General Auto Parts Co., 40 F. Supp. 364 (W. D. Mo. 1941) (to
hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the Act to give workingmen a remedy
in a court easily accessible to them). Case criticized in (1942) 55 HARv. L. REv.
541 stating that no such contention can be found in the Congressional debates on
the Act; Booth v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 44 F. Supp. 451 (D. Neb. 1942);
Fredman v. Foley Bros., 50 F. Supp. 161 (W. D.. Mo. 1943); Tobin v. Hercules
Powder Co., 63 F. Supp. 434 (D. Del. 1945); Smith v. Day & Zimmerman. Inc.,
65 F. Supp. 209 (S. D. Iowa 1946).
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in the report 7 which indicates any intention to do anything other than
permit an employee's suit."2 8
Closely interwoven with this argument is the desire of the federal
29
judges to avoid crowding the federal docket with many small claims.
However, a survey of the cases reveals that the amount in controversy
has been deemed important in only two decisions. 30 Furthermore many
cases denying removal have involved amounts over $3,000,31 while in
others the amount is not deemed of sufficient importance to even be
mentioned in the opinion.3 2 Judge Briggle states that these ideas are
reasons perhaps why Congress "should have excepted these cases" from
33
the Removal Statute, but the question is what Congress actually did.
The other companion reason in this line of analogy by district courts
remanding suits under the F. L. S. A. to the state courts in which they
were started is the avoidance of expensive litigation by the employee.
R.
257H.
8

REP. No. 2738, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938).
Swettman et al. v. Remington
Rand, 65 Supp. 940, 944 (S. D. Ill. 1946)
("The situation before the conference committee of the two Houses was thus:
The Senate Bill provided for suits, by employees and gave concurrent jurisdiction
to State and Federal Courts; the House Bill contained no provision for employees'
suits but conferred jurisdiction on the Federal Courts to enjoin violations of the
Act. On June 14, 1938, the conference committee presented a report which contained Sections 16 and 17 of the Act as subsequently enacted.... In the conference
committee's report to the House recommending the enactment of the Act in its final
form appears the following comment regarding Section 16: '... . This section also
provides for civil reparations for violations of the wages and hours provisions. If
an employee is employed for less than the legal minimum wage, or if he is employed
in excess of the specified hours without receiving the prescribed payment for overtime, he may recover from his employer twice the amount by which the compensation he should have received exceeds that which he actually received.' ... Nothing
appears in the report which indicates an intention to do anything other than permit
an employee's suit. The conference committee merely adopted the Senate's view
with respect to the allowance of such employee's suit and also the Senate's view
as to concurrent jurisdiction as to both State and Federal Courts by using the
words 'any court of competent jurisdiction"'). See note 22 supra.
' See note 26 supra as the cases discuss these two arguments together.
80 Harris v. Reno Oil Co., 48 F. Supp. 908 (N. D. Tex. 1943)
(judge emphasized fact that the district court was in the same city as the state court where
action started plus fact that the amount in controversy was $4,000 and diversity of
citizenship was present); Wright v. Long et at., 65 F. Supp. 279 (W. D. Mo.
1944).
redman v. Foley Bros., 50 F. Supp. 161 (W. D. Mo. 1943) ($19,200 and
diversity of citizenship); Garner v. Mengel Co., 50 F. Supp. 794 (W. D. Ky.
1943) ($4,889 and diversity of citizenship; however, see comment on this case note
13 supra) ; Brantley v. Augusta Ice & Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. Ga. 1943)
(over $3,000, but no diversity of citizenship) ; Steiner v. Pleasantville Construction,
Inc.,
59 F. Supp. 1011 (S.D. N. Y. 1944) (over $3,000 and diversity of citizenship).
' 2 Kuligowski v. Hart, 43 F. Supp. 207 (N. D. Ohio
1941) ; Duval v. Protes,
51 F. Supp. 967 (E. D. N. Y. 1943); Smith v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 65 F.
Supp. 209 (S.D. Iowa 1946) ; Apple v. Shulman Publications, 65 F. Supp. 677
(D. N. J.1943).
6' See comment on Swetthnan case note 24 supra. McCarrigle v. 11 Forty
Second St. Corp., 48 F. Supp. 710, 711 (S.D. N. Y. 1942) ("While I realize"
that such a decision "is likely to bring to this court a considerable number of
cases, many of which could be brought and disposed of in local courts with less
inconvenience to the litigants . . . until Congress shall amend the statute . . . I
feel constrained to follow" the cases granting removal.).
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However, this point is weakened by the provision of the Act which
allows the employee to recover, in addition to double his unpaid mini34
mum wages, a reasonable attorney's fee.
Other miscellaneous points considered include the recitations of the
rule that courts should not interpret a statute so as to make parts of it
surplusage unless no other construction is available.3 5 Contra decisions
counter with the rule that a partial repeal of the Removal Statute by
implication is not favored 6
One excellent argument for the state court's retention of the suit
once it is commenced in that court which has not been heavily seized
upon is the fact that in the same sentence with the much discussed "may
be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction" is a provision that7
"employees may designate an agent or a representative to maintains
such an action." As obviously Congress meant that the designated representative might continue the suit to completion, these decisions believe
that the same interpretation should be given the word "maintain"
8
throughout, thereby attaching continuity.
Since the point is very close there are naturally excellent arguments
on both sides of the question. However, it is submitted despite the
numerical weight of the decision contrathat the better reasoned decisions
are those granting removal. In view of the lack of any express evidence
of a Congressional intent that the multi-meaning word "maintained" did
in the F. L. S. A. mean to carry the suit through to completion 0 the
more reasonable view is that no amendment to the Removal Statute was
meant or implied.
Yet, due to the lack of uniformity in the decisions vithin the same
state4 0 and even within the same federal district,41 in order to preserve
"'Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U. S. C. A. §216(b).

"The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fees to be paid by the defendant, and
costs of the action."
"Brantley v. Augusta Ice & Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 158 (S.D. Ga. 1943);
Smith v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Iowa 1946) ; Young v.
Arbyrd Compress Co., 66 F. Supp. 241 (E. D. Mo. 1946).
"Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Corp., 32 F. Supp. 956, 958 (D. N. J. 1940);
Owens v. Greenville News-Piedmont Corp., 43 F. Supp. 785 (W. D. S. C. 1942);
Garner v. Mengel Co., 50 F. Supp. 794 (W. D. Ky. 1943); Sonnesyn v. Federal
Cartridge Co., 54 F. Supp. 29 (D. Minn. 1944); Swettman et al v. Remington
Rand, 65 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Ill. 1946). Contra: Fredman v. Foley Bros., 50 F.
Supp. 161 (W. D. Mo. 1943) (see comment on case in note 25 supra) ; Smith v.
Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 209 (S. D. Iowa 1946) ; Young v. Arbyrd
Compress Co., 66 F. Supp. 241, 243 (E.D. Mo. 1946) ("The removal statute has
not been repealed. It still stands. We simply hold it not applicable to cases of
the character (F.L. S. A.) before the court.").
"'Italics author's. 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 28 U. S. C. A. §216(b).
"' Fredman v. Foley Bros., 50 F. Supp. 161 (W. D. Mo. 1943); Brantley v.
Augusta Ice & Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 158 (S.D. Ga. 1943) ; Steiner v. Pleasantvile Construction, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 1011 (S. D. N. Y. 1944).
See notes 22, 25, and 28 supra.
,0 Cases denying removal are listed first. Garner v. Mengel Co., 50 F. Supp.
161 (W. D. Ky. 1943). Contra: Cox v. Gatliff Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 482 (E.D.
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209

needed order and respect for the judicial system, Congressional action
seems imperative. It is submitted that Congress should, in addition to
scrupulously abstaining from the future use of the word "maintained"
without a clear cut definition, reword Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to dispel all of the current confusion which has attached
to the problem of whether suits brought in state courts under the
F. L. S. A. are removable to federal district courts or not. The
F. L. S. A. is certain to come under Congressional scrutiny in connection with the now famous portal to portal question 42 and such a rewording of Section 16(b) could be advantageously accomplished at the
same time. A workable standard may be found in the eighth sentence
of Section 28 of the Judicial Code3 which permits removal of suits
44
only
against common carriers under the Interstate Commerce Act
when they involve more than $3,000. This would provide sufficient federal decisions to which state courts could look for guidance thereby
avoiding too many jurisdictional inconsistencies.
NOEL R. S. WOODHOUSE.

Insurance--Extension of Coverage by Waiver or Estoppel
Plaintiff insurer sought a declaratory judgment to- determine its liability on an automobile liability policy. The policy contained the following: "This policy does not apply: (a) while the automobile is used
as a public or livery conveyance. . . ." There was also a clause limiting
the agent's power with respect to waiver and estoppel. Answering two
issues submitted to it, the jury found (1) the automobile was used as
a public conveyance, and (2) the agent knew it was to be so used when
he issued the policy. Defendant abandoned a plea for reformation. The
trial court disregarded the second issue and gave judgment for plaintiff.
On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the submission of the
second issue was inadvertent as it rested upon parol evidence which
Ky. 1943). See comment note 13 supra on these two cases. Barron v. F. H. E.
Oil Co., 4 Wage & Hour Rep. 551 (W. D. Tex. 1941). Contra: Harris v. Reno
Oil Co., 48 F. Supp. 908 (N. D. Tex. 1943). See also cases listed in note 41 infra.
" Cases denying removal are listed first. Apple v. Shulman Publications, 65
F. Supp. 677 (D. N. J. 1943). Contra: Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Corp., 32 F.
Supp. 956 (D. N. J. 1940) (really a dictum, however, cited both pro and con
often). Duval v. Protes, 51 F. Supp. 967 (E. D. N. Y. 1943). Contra: Ellems
v. Helmers, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 566 (E. D. N. Y. 1944). Sheridan v. Leitner, 59 F.
Supp. 1011 (S. D. N. Y. 1944). Contra: McCarrigle v. 11 W. Forty Second
St. Corp., 48 F. Supp. 710 (S. D. N. Y. 1942). In each of these cases the judges
were different and in the later of the two in each district the judge did not bother
or overrule the previous contra decisions.
to distinguish
'2 N. Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1946, §E, p. 3, col. 3.
4136 STAT. 1094 (1914), 28 U. S. C. A. §71.
"41 STAT. 474 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. §1 et seq.
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varies the terms of the written agreement; and the first issue established
exclusion from liability.'
This case raises several questions of interest, an exhaustive analysis
of which is beyond the scope of this note. They may, however, be
briefly reckoned with. The first question is, What effect does a clause
against waiver of policy provisions have on waivers which otherwise
would result from that which leads to the issuance of a policy?
Provisions in an insurance policy which restrict the power of an
agent relative to waiver do not become operative until the policy is
issued.2 Such provisions are a part of the contract, and it logically
follows that they can have no operative effect until the policy issues.
Thus, they can only apply to something which comes into existence after
the inception of the contract. Restrictive provisions in the policy can
have no effect upon what took place before the policy issued.3 The cases
supporting these rules are, for the most part, cases involving waiver of
conditions, the breach or nonexistence of which would forfeit the policy.
There is a dearth of cases applying these rules to situations where an
insurer issues a policy with knowlodge of conditions which would render the policy merely ineffective for the purpose intended, rather than
forfeited. But certainly no one could reasonably contend that the announced rules do not apply to the latter situation. To do so would be
to assume that the insurer did not intend to execute a valid, effective
contract embodying the intentions of the parties. 4 Also, failure to apply
the rules to such situations would give the insurer a legal license to
perpetrate fraud on the insured, in view of the known fact that few
persons read their policies.
The second question to be briefly examined is, Should the parol evidence rule operate to preclude the admission of evidence of the negotiations preceding issuance of a policy? Parol evidence is admissible
where it is sought to reform an instrument,3 or to show fraud in connection therewith.6 Insurance policies can be reformed by parol evidence for mistake of one superinduced by fraud or inequitable conduct
of the other.7 The argument in the foregoing paragraph is equally
741 ;(1946).
574,17939S.S.E.E.457(2d)(1935)
N. C.
C.99,
Insurance Co. v. Wells, 226 N.
Case v. Ewbanks,
2 Smith v. Insurance Co., 208
194 N. C. 775, 140 S. E. 709 (1927); Aldridge v. Insurance Co., 194 N. C. 683,
140 S. E. 706 (1927); Bullard v. Insurance Co., 189 N. C. 34, 126 S. E. 179
(1925) ; Johnson v. Insurance Co., 172 N. C. 142, 90 S. E. 124 (1916) ; VANCE,
INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) §126 (".. . limitations contained in the policy could
have no effect as to transactions prior to the delivery of the policy ... ).
2 16 APPLEMAN, INsURANCE LAW AND PRACricE (1944) §9101; VANCE, INSUR.ANCE (2d ed. 1930) §126.

'English v. Casualty Co., 138 Ohio St. 166, 34 N. E. (2d) 31 (1941).
'Hubbard v. Home, 203 N. C. 205, 163 S. E. 347 (1932) (mistake, fraud,

and accident furnish exceptions to the general rule).
surprise
6
Trust Co. v. Knight, 160 N. C. 592, 76 S. E. 623 (1912).
'Williams v. Insurance Co., 209. N. C. 765, 185 S.E. 21 (1936).
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applicable here; i.e., to allow an insurer to issue a policy with knowledge
of facts rendering it ineffective for the purpose intended works a fraud
on the insured. Since this is, in effect, a fraud on the insured, or at all
events the evidence of estoppel in such a situation is evidence of inequitable conduct, and parol evidence is admissible where reformation
is sought, such evidence should be allowed to show the insurer's knowledge when the policy was issued." And this should be, even though
the plea for reformation is abandoned, as in the principal case, because
the court may grant any relief consistent with the facts pleaded. 9 Further, estoppel serves the same purpose in law as reformation does in
equity. Since law and equity are combined under the code, there can
be no valid reason to exclude parol evidence. The decision in the principal case places the insurer in an advantageous position. An unscrupulous company may issue a policy which it knows will not cover the
risk intended. When loss occurs, it can bring suit for declaratory judgment on the policy, and if the insured does not ask for ieformation,
the company escapes all liability. It retains the premiums for which it
has given no consideration. And this is the result even though an
equitable remedy, declaratory judgment, is sought.
The final question, and the principal one to be considered is, Should
the law allow the coverage of an insurance policy to be extended by
waiver or estoppel? By waiver is meant implied waiver; it is assumed
that express waiver upon consideration is a contract itself and presents
no problem. The problem of extension of risk comes before the court
when there is involved in a suit an insurance policy containing conditions and/or exceptions. The distinction between conditions and exceptions is not always clear. A provision is clearly a condition when
it provides that upon a certain occurrence the policy will be void. An
exception withdraws from coverage a risk which the insurer does not
wish to assume. An exception always involves a risk while a condition
may or may not involve a risk.10
According to some authorities, the general rule in the United States
is that neither waiver nor estoppel can create a contract of insurance or
so apply as to bring within the coverage of the policy property or a loss
or risk, which by the terms of the policy is excepted or otherwise excluded." An examination of the cases cited by these authorities in
I Midkiff and Brannock v. Insurance Co., 197 N. C. 139, 147 S. E. 812 (1929) ;
Gerringer v. Insurance Co., 133 N. C. 407, 45 S. E. 773 (1903); Strause v. Insurance Co., 128 N. C. 64, 38 S. E. 256 (1901) ; see Johnson and Stroud v. Insurance Co., 172 N. C. 142, 90 S. E. 124 (1916); VAxcF, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930)
§136, note 86.
McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRAcTIcE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §401.
" VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) §116 (distinction drawn between warranties,
conditions and exceptions, and illustrated).
11
RICHARDS, THE LAW OF INSURANCE (4th ed. 1932) §115; 29 Am. Jur., Insurance §801 ("However, the doctrine of implied waiver or of estoppel is not
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support of the proposition discloses the inherent weakness of the generalization. 1 2 Still, many cases have quoted this "general rule" with
approval.' 3 But these cases reveal only the instability of the doctrine
and a considerable amount of confusion attending it.14 And the conclusion is warranted that the cases do not support the doctrine that insurance coverage is not to be extended by waiver or estoppel. In fact,
analysis of the cases supports the opposite conclusion as to estoppel.
Although it is apparent that whether extension will be allowed is
largely dependent upon the facts of each case, some reasonably accurate
generalizations may be made. Those cases which declare that waiver or
estoppel will not extend coverage ordinarily are those in which the insurance policy has a field of operation beyond the risk not covered, and
conditions occur which render the policy merely inoperative as distinguished from void or a nullity.15 This result is supportable on the
available to bring within the coverage of a policy risks not covered by its terms or
risks expressly excluded therefrom.); id. §903; 45 C. J. S., Insurance §674; note
(1939) 38 MIcH. L. REv. 104 (1939).
2 To illustrate, the following cases are cited in 29 Am. Jur., Insurance §903,
footnote 2: Miller v. Banker's Life Ass'n, 138 Ark. 442, 212 S. W. 310, 7 A. L. R.
378 (1919) (elements of wiaver not present) ; Norton v. Catholic Order of Foresters, 138 Iowa 464, 114 N. W. 893, 24 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1030 (1908) (elements
of waiver not present, estoppel not considered); Ridgeway v. Modern Woodmen,
98 Kan. 240, 157 Pac. 1191, L. R. A. 1917A, 1062 (1916) (facts did not constitute
waiver, general rule supported only by inference); Bower & Kaufman v. Bothwell, 152 Md. 392, 136 AtI. 892, 52 A. L. R. 158 (1927) (general rule suppoited
only as to estoppel, waiver must have consideration); Washington Nat. Ins. Co.
v. Craddock, 130 Tex. 251, 109 S.W. (2d) 165, 113 A. L. R. 854 (1937) (supports general rule as to waiver, not clear on estoppel) ; Rosenthal v. Insurance
Co., 158 Wis. 550, 149 N. W. 155, L. R. A. 1915B 361, Ann. Cas. 1916E 395 (1914)
(supports general rule as to waiver but by dictum, evidence of waiver weak);
McCoy v. Northwestern Ass'n, 92 Wis. 577, 66 N. W. 697, 47 L. R. A. 681 (1896)
(supports general rule).
"*Carnes v. Assurance Corp., 101 F. (2d) 739 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939); Insurance
Co. v. Roberts, 132 F. (2d) 798 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939); Insurance Co. v. Raper,
242 Ala. 440, 6 So. (2d) 513 (1941) ; Assurance Soc. v. Langford, 234 Ala. 681,
176 So. 609 (1937) ; Insurance Co. v. Motor Co., 227 Ala. 449, 150 So. 486 (1933) ;
Insurance Co. v. Smith, 200 Ark. 508, 139 So. (2d) 411 (1940); Quillion v.
Assurance Soc., 61 Ga. App. 138, 6 S. E. (2d) 108 (1939); Insurance Co. v.
Eviston, 110 Ind. App. 143, 37 N. E. (2d) 310 (1941); Richardson v. Traveling
Men's Ass'n, 228 Iowa 319, 291 N. W. 408 (1940) ; Pierce v. Life Ass'n, 223 Iowa
211, 272 N. W. 543 (1937) ; Insurance Co. v. Brookman, 167 Md. 616, 175 Atl.
838 (1934) ; Carew v. Casualty Co., 189 Wash. 329, 65 P. (2d) 689 (1939) ; McCoy v. Northwestern Ass'n, 92 Wis. 577, 66 N. W. 697, 47 L. R. A. 681 (1896).
C%
Referring to the cases cited supra note 13:
In Insurance Co. v. Raper, the court cited the case of Insurance Co. v. Scharnagel, 227 Ala. 60, 148 So. 596 (1933) which held that denial of liability on another ground estops the company from setting up exception as defense. In
Assurance Soc. v. Langford, the court said, ".. . a ground on which payment may
be resisted may be waived." In Insurance Co. 'v. Motor Co., Insurance Co. v.
Scharnagel,supra, is again cited. In Insurance Co. v. Smith, elements of estoppel
were lacking. In Richardson v. Tray. Men's Ass'n, the question of estoppel was
not involved. In Carew v. Casualty Co., support of the rule was by dictum. In
McCoy v. Northwestern Ass'n, a weak case of estoppel is made out.
"Fidelity & Guar. Corp. v. Bilquist, 99 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938);
Insurance Co. v. Raper, 242 Ala. 440, 6 So. (2d) 513 (1941); Insurance Co. v.
Smith, 200 Ark. 508, 139 S.W. (2d) 411 (1940) ; Quillion v. Assurance Soc., 61
Ga. App. 138, 6 S.E. (2d) 108 (1939) ; Ridgeway v. Modern Woodmen, 98 Kan.
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ground that the insured received some protection as consideration for
his premiums since the policy was merely suspended during the occurrence of the excluded risk, and would become effective again upon
cessation of that condition. However, in the cases so holding, elements
of estoppel have been totally lacking or very weak. Therefore, in most
of the cases where the courts have said coverage cannot be extended by
waiver or estoppel, the word "estoppel" has been dictum.
Undoubtedly a majority of the courts will allow extension of coverage by estoppel. 16 Most of the cases deal with a situation where, under
a policy of liability insurance, the insurer defends the action against the
insured and is thereafter held estopped to deny liability on the policy.
Although the courts do not mention extending the coverage, it is nonetheless true that that is the result accomplished.
This note is not concerned with the technical distinctions between
waiver and estoppel, but with extension by one or the other or both.
240, 157 Pac. 1191, L. R. A. 1917A 1062 (1916); Lumber Co. v. Insurance Co.,
179 La. 779, 155 So. 22 (1934); cf. Quinones v. Life and Cas. Co., 209 La. 76,
24 So. (2d) 270 (1945) ; Insurance Co. v. Brookman, 167 Md. 616, 175 AtI. 838
(1934); Ruddock v. Insurance Co., 209 Mich. 638, 177 N. W. 242 (1920); Casualty Co. v. Adams, 159 Miss. 88, 131 So. 544 (1931) ; Rosenberg v. Assurance Co.,
246 S. W. 1009 (Mo. App. 1922); Craddock v. Insurance Co., 130 Tex. 251, 109
S. W. (2d) 165; 113 A. L. R. 854 (1937); Two Rivers Co. v. Casualty Co., 168
Wis. 96, 169 N. W. 291 (1918) ; McCoy v. Northwestern Ass'n, 92 Wis. 577, 66
N. W. 697, 47 L. R. A. 681 (1896) ; anno. 113 A. L. R. 857.
" Claverie v. Casualty Co., 76 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935); Assurance
Corp. v. Chicago and B. M. Co., 141 Fed. 965 (C. C. A. 7th, 1905); Assurance
Soc. v. Langford, 242 Ala. 440, 176 So. 609 (1937) ; Indemnity Ass'n v. Supply
Co., 211 Ala. 84, 99 So. 787 (1924) ; Knights v. Shoaf, 166 Ind. 367, 77 N. E. 738
(1906) ; Conner v. Insurance Co., 122 Cal. App. 105, 9 P. (2d) 863 (1932) ; Insurance Co. v. White, 106 Ind. App. 530, 19 N. E. (2d) 872 (1939) ; Palumbro v.
Insurance Co., 293 Mass. 35, 199 N. E. 335 (1935) ; Lunt v. Insurance Co., 261
Mass. 469, 159 N. E. 461 (1928) (by implication) ; Leverett v. Casualty Co., 247
Mich. 172, 225 N. W. 515 (1929) (distinguished from Ruddock v. Insurance Co.,
209 Mich. 638, 177 N. W. 242 (1920) on ground that estoppel occurred before
loss); Humphrey v. Polski, 161 Minn. 61, 200 N. W. 812 (1924) (by implication); Mann v. Assurance Corp., 123 Minn. 305, 143 N. W. 794 (1913); Tozer
v. Accident and Guar. Co., 94 Minn. 478, 103 N. W. 509 (1905), affd on appeal,
99 Minn. 290, 109 N. W. 410 (1906); Cowell v. Indemnity Corp., 326 Mo. 1103,
34 S. W. (2d) 705 (1930) ; Keck v. Insurance Co., 237 Mo. App. 308, 167 S. W.
(2d) 664 (1942) ; Rieger v. Guaranty and Acc. Co., 202 Mo. App. 184, 215 S. W. 920
(1919); Royle v. Casualty Co., 161 Mo. App. 185, 142 S. W. 438 (1912), former
appeal, 126 Mo. App. 104, 103 S. W. 1098 (1907); Fairbanks v. Guaranty and
Acc. Co., 154 Mo. App. 327, 133 S. W. 664 (1911); Lipe v. Insurance Co., 142
Neb. 22, 5 N. W. (2d) 95 (1942) ; Moore v. Fidelity and Guar., Co., 293 N. Y.
119, 56 N. E. (2d) 74 (1944) ; Gerka v. Fidelity and Cas. Co., 251 N. Y. 51, 167
N. E. 169 (1929) ; Draper v. Relief Ass'n, 190 N. Y. 12, 82 N. E. 755 (1907) ;
Early v. Insurance Co., 224 N. C. 172, 29 S. E. (2d) 558 (1944); Fidelity and
Cas. Co. v. Blausey, 49 Ohio App. 556, 197 N. E. 385 (1934); Humes Const. Co.
v. Casualty Co., 32 R. I. 246, 79 At. 1, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 906 (1911) ; Ellis v.
Casualty Co., 187 S. C. 162, 197 S. E. 510 (1938); Ziegler v. Ryan, 66 S. D. 491,
285 N. W. 875 (1939) ; Mancini v. Thomas, 113 Vt. 317, 34 A. (2d) 105 (1943) ;
Beatty v. Assurance Corp., 106 Vt. 216, 168 At. 919 (1933); Lumber Co. v. Insurance Co., 159 Wis. 627, 150 N. W. 991 (1915) (by implication); see Hargett
v. Insurance Co., 12 Cal. App. (2d) 449,55 P. (2d) 1258, 1261 (1938). 16 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE (1944) §9090, note 35; CooLEY's BRIEls ON
INsuINcE (2d ed. 1927) Vol. 5, p. 393.
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However, it may be pointed out that there are cases which declare that
extension is not to be accomplished by waiver while it may be by
estoppel.' 7 On the other hand, there are cases which declare that either
or both waiver and estopel may be invoked to prevent injustice.' 8 In
Fairbanks Canning Co. v. London Guar. and Acc. Co.,1' where the insurer defended an action against the insured, pursuant to a clause in a
liability policy, with full knowledge of facts upon which it could deny
coverage, the court said: "Such action is sometimes said to constitute
estoppel in pais; sometimes it is denominated an election of position
which cannot afterwards be changed; sometimes it is said to be a contemporaneous construction of the contract by the party claimed to be
bound; and yet again it is called a waiver. But in whatever way it may
be designated it is such conduct on the part of the insurer as will cut him
out of a defense he might have made. . . ." And in Delaware Ins. Co.
v. Wallace,"0 where the policy contained a provision limiting coverage
to property only while in a specified place, the court said: "There may
be waiver of such provision, estoppel to assert it, or agreements affecting it. . .

."

Further, there are those cases where waiver alone has

been pleaded and coverage has been extended. 21 Cases often arise where
the policy sued on contains a provision relating to coverage as distinguished from cases where the policy in question, by necessary inference
only, does not cover the particular loss. To avoid an inequitable and
obviously unjust result which would occur if extension were not allowed, but confronted with the contention that coverage may not be
extended by waiver or estoppel, the courts call such provisions, provisions for the benefit of the insurer which may be waived, 22 an accepted
27 Claverie v. Casualty Co., 76 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935); Indemnity
Ass'n v. Supply Co., 211 Ala. 84, 99 So. 787 (1924); Conner v. Insurance Co.,

122 Cal. App. 105, 9 P. (2d) 863 (1932) ; Knights v. Shoaf, 166 Ind. 367, 77 N. E.
738 (1906) ; Insurance Co. v. White, 106 Ind. App. 530, 19 N. E. (2d) 872 (1939) ;
Palumbro v. Insurance Co., 293 Mass. 35, 199 N. E. 335 (1935) ; Keck v. Insurance Co., 237 Mo. App. 308, 167 S. W. (2d) 664 (1942) ; Draper v. Relief Ass'n,
190 N. Y. 12, 82 N. E. 755 (1907) ; Mancini v. Thomas, 113 Vt. 317, 34 A. (2d)
105 (1943) ; Beatty v. Assurance Corp., 106 Vt. 216, 168 Atl. 919 (1933).
18Insurance
Co. v. Scharnagel, 227 Ala. 60, 148 So. 596 (1933) ; Leverett v.
Casualty Co., 247 Mich. 172, 225 N. W. 515 (1929); Rieger v. Guaranty and
Acc. Co., 202 Mo. App. 184, 215 S. W. 920 (1919); Fairbanks v. Guaranty and
Acc. Co., 154 Mo. App. 327, 133 S. W. 664 (1911); Royle v. Casualty Co., 126
Mo. App. 104, 103 S. W. 1098 (1907), aff'd on appeal, 161 Mo. App. 185, 142 S. W.
438 (1912); Myton v. Casualty Co., 117 Mo. App. 442, 92 S. W. 1194 (1906);
Lipe v. Insurance Co., 142 Neb. 22, 5 N. W. (2d) 95 (1942) (action was to recover premiums paid on policy which excluded from coverage any one over 65,
recovery denied because insurer waived age requirement and "waiver" ripened into
"estoppel").
" 154 Mo. App. 327, 133 S. W. 664 (1911).
" 160 S. W. 1130 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
" Casualty Co. v. Aarons, 85 Colo. 591, 277 Pac. 811 (1929) ; Insurance Co. v.
Ransdell, 259 Ky. 559, 82 S. W. (2d) 820 (1935); Barker v. Insurance Co., 52
S. W. (2d) 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
22 Quinones v. Insurance Co., 209 La. 76, 24 So. (2d) 270 (1945)
(military
clause).
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risk subject to a condition subsequent, a promissory warranty.
By
so doing, each court has extended coverage without discussing the issue
or even mentioning it.
Turning now to North Carolina, in Johnson and Stroud v. R. I.
Insurance Co., 25 a policy was issued on a building in process of erection.
The policy excepted liability if the building was not enclosed and under
roof. The court said, by way of dictum, that if the insurer issued the
policy knowing of conditions existing at the time, it could not thereafter
avoid liability on account of those conditions. Thus, had loss occurred
before the building was enclosed, coverage would be extended. In
Midkiff and Brannock v. Insurance Co. 26 a fire policy excepted liability
while explosives were kept on the premises. Loss occurred while explosives were kept. The court said: "Conditions with respect to the
property insured . . . existing at the time the policy was issued, ...
cannot be relied upon to defeat liability under the policy. When the
policy was issued with such knowledge, it will be held that the company
has waived the breach of the stipulations and provisions contained
therein, which would otherwise render the policy void at its inception."
The provision was not a condition working a forfeiture, as the court
seemed to consider it, but was clearly an exception to liability. The
keeping of explosives was material to the risk. So here extension was
allowed. In Early v. Insurance Co. 27 it was said, by way of dictum,
that the objection that liability is not within the terms of the policy may
28
be waived. The case of Royle Mining Co. v. Fidelity and Cas. C0.
was cited which held that defense by the insurer of an action brought
against the insured, by a third party, constituted waiver of an exception
and estopped the insurer from thereafter asserting it. In McCabe et al.
v. Casualty Co.2 9 it was held that a provision in an accident policy limiting coverage to persons 18 to 65 years could not be waived. However,
in that case the policy provided for a return of premiums to persons over
65, and this undoubtedly influenced the court's decision. Thus, it is seen
that in North Carolina extension of coverage by waiver or estoppel is
possible and has been allowed.
Extension of insurance coverage by waiver and/or estoppel should
be allowed in proper cases. To do so merely accomplishes the purpose
for which these doctrines were introduced into the law. 0
CLAuDE, F. SEILA.

"*Keistler Co. v. Insurance Co., 124 S. C. 32, 117 S. E. 70 (1923) (clause pro-

viding for non-liability if building collapses except as result of fire).
2"Colby v. Insurance Co., 134 Me. 18, 181 Atl. 13 (1935) (clause providing
for non-liability if car used without permission).
-5172 N. C. 142, 90 S. E. 124 (1916).
2"1197 N. C. 139, 147 S. E. 812 (1929).
'224 N. C. 172, 29 S. E. (2d) 558 (1944).
2s126 Mo. App. 104, 103 S. W. 1098 (1907).
"209
N. C. 577, 183 S. E. 743 (1936).
"0 Humes Const. Co.
v. Philadelphia Cas. Co., 32 R. I. 246, 79 Atl. 1, Ann. Cas.
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Labor Law-Employer's Freedom of SpeechThe Captive Audience1
To what extent and under what circumstances the employer may
speak to his employees concerning labor matters arises in connection
with that prohibition of the Wagner Act 2 which provides that it shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain
or coerce employees" 3 in the exercise of the "right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations .

.

. and to engage in con-

certed activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection." 4
The constitutional issue of freedom of speech under the Act is
usually raised in one of two ways: (1) where a certain utterance by
the employer is alleged to be coercive per se,5 or (2) where a certain
utterance, possibly innocent standing alone, is elevated to the position
of coercion when viewed against a background of anti-union conduct.6
The National Labor Relations Board often describes the utterance as
"inextricably intertwined" with other unfair practices.
The recent Board decision of In re Clark Brothers7 raises the freedom of speech issue in still another situation ;8 namely, where an admit1912D, 906 (1911) (the nature of the doctrine of estoppel is to extend liability;
it is not invoked for the purpose of enforcing a true obligation or one clearly
defined by the terms of a contract).
I The scope of this note does not purport to cover the general problem of the
employer's freedom of speech under the Wagner Act. Recent articles and notes
on the broad question are the following: Daykin, The Employer's Right of Free
Industry Under the National Labor Relations Act (1945) 40 ILl. L.
Speech in.
Rxv.; Howard, Freedon of Speech and Labor Controversies (1943) 8 Mo. L.
REv. 25; Notes (1946) 34 CALrF. L. REv. 415; (1945) 14 FORDHAM L. REv. 59.
2
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §151-166
(1940
ed.).
3
1d. §158(1).
'Id. §157.
'The National Labor Relations Board's view of this type utterance is shown
in the TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (1945) 37:
"It is well established that free speech does not privilege statements which coerce
employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization. In many instances,
the coercive element is inherent in the statement itself.... Typical of this class
of statments, which are per se violative of Section 8(I), are those containing
actual, implied, or veiled threats of economic reprisal." An example of this type
of case is the following: Threat to move the plant. In re New Era Die Co., 19
N. L. R. B. 227 (1940), affrmed as modified, 118 F. (2d) 500 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1941).
" . . the Board has continued to- hold that anti-union statements by an employer when an integral phrase of other anti-union conduct constitutes interference, restraint and coercion within the meaning of the Act." EIGHTH ANNua
REPORT OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONs BOARD (1943) 29.
Often utterances are considered by the Board merely as evidence of the employer's intent: "The First Amendment to the United States Constitution does
not preclude a fact-finding body from making an evidentiary use of-speech any
more than the Fifth Amendment prohibits it from weighing 'authority or power,'
'relation or opportunity,' inclination, motive, or non-verbal conduct." In re Dow
Chemical Co., 13 N. L. R. B. 993, 1015 (1939).
'70 N. L. R. B. No. 60, 18 LAB. REL. REP. 1360 (1946).
' Chairman Herzog of the National Labor Relations Board, in an address be-
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tedly privileged speech9 concerning the employees' organizational affairs
is delivered by the employer (or associates) to his assembled employees
on company premises during working hours, i.e., to a "captive audience."
For the first time the Board held that such a speech under these circumstances constituted an unfair practice, "wholly apart from the fact
The
that the speech itself may be privileged under the Constitution."'
Board found that the respondent had projected himself into the run-off
election between the CIO and the Association (independent union) by
mailing anti-CIO bulletins to the employees, inserting paid advertisements in the local newspaper, and delivering two anti-union speeches
to its assembled employees, on company premises and during working
hours, one of the speeches being delivered by the company president
an hour before the election." The speeches explicitly stated that each
employee would be "absolutely free to vote in accordance with [his]
. . .own desire. . . . That there will be no retaliation or discrimination. .. ." And further (company president's speech) that "Nobody in

this plant, as long as I am running it, will be discriminated against
because of the way he votes or . . . thinks."

The president's speech

expressed praise over the "honorable and straight-forward way" of improving conditions in the plant by the cooperation of the independent
union, and stated concern over the "possibility of disturbing the peaceful progress ....,,12
fore the Annual Convention of Industrial Relations Sections of the Printing
Industry of America, 18 LAn. REL. Rui. 338 (1946), lists four ways in which the
issue of freedom of speech arises under the Act: First, privileged statements:
"The Board has stated repeatedly in its recent decisions that an employer's right
to express his opinion to employees in respect to labor issues is secured by the
First Amendment if it falls short of being coercive. The statement must appeal
to the employee's reason, not to fear . .. or merely corrects misstatements of
fact in a union campaign. . ." Second, coercive utterances: "When to persuasion
other elements are added which bring coercion, or give it that character . . . 'the
limit of right has been passed.' . . . Sound policy dictates, and the Wagner Act
assumes, that employers should not intrude upon the choice, subject always to
their constitutional right to express an opinion." Third, utterances which are an
. in determining whether a
integral part of an anti-union course of conduct: "'...
course of conduct amounts to restraint or coercion, pressure exerted vocally by
the employer may no more be disregarded than pressure exerted in other ways'"
(citing National Labor Relations Board v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 314
U. S.469, 471 (1942)). Fourth, speeches delivered to a captive audience.
'Although the principal decision is not clear as to whether the Board in the
absence o.f a captive audience would have held the speech privileged or as part of
the complex of anti-union conduct, the fact is unimportant for our purposes, since
the majority reached the result that the speech in its setting was coercive regardless of its constitutionally privileged character standing alone.
• In re Clark Bros., cited supra note 7, at p. 3 of the opinion.
The Board affirmed the trial examiner's finding of (1) surveillance by the
company's labor relations director over the union's activities; (2) discrimination
against the CIO by unfair enforcement of a company rule prohibiting union
solicitation on company premises during non-working hours; and (3) a determined
campaign of literature and speeches by the company designed to insure the defeat
of the CIO and the victory of the inside association.
"The specific points made in the vice-president's speech were: (1) The employees were free to join any organization they desired; (2) the company's war
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The Board found, even though there were other unfair practices
upon which to base its "cease and desist" order, that the "conduct of
the respondent in compelling its employees to listen to a speech on selforganization under the circumstances . . . independently constitutes
interference, restraint and coercion within the meaning of the Act."'u
The reasons given are these:
1. Rights guaranteed to employees by the Act include "full freedom
to receive aid, advice and information for others" concerning these
rights. Such freedom is meaningless when they are forced to receive
such aid, advice, etc.
2. The employer's economic control during working hours gave him
exclusive and assured access to his employees in the matter of their
14
organizational activities.
3. The compulsory assembly was not a necessary part of the speech.
"The law may and does prevent such use of force without denying the
right to speak."
4. The use of the employer's economic power to compel his employees to listen to such speeches independently violated Section 8(1)
of the Act.15
5. The American Tube Bending case'16 did not decide the issue
involved here-whether a privileged speech to a captive audience thereby
ceases to be privileged-for although the facts were similar in that case
(pre-election speech to a captive audience) the Board at that time had
never considered the question independently.
Board Member Reilly vigorously dissented on these grounds:
1. The case of National Labor Relations Board v. Virginia Electric
record was a "shining light" against the background of strife in plants where
outside unions were in charge; (3) the management believed that successful
operation of the plant could best be achieved by an inside union; (4) the outside
union was mainly interested in the dues it would collect from the employees; and
(5) it would be extremely "difficult to maintain the same harmonious relationship
which now exists should an outside organization inject itself into ours."
The president's speech specifically stated: (1) Company wages were considerably higher than wages in CIO plants. (2) The company and its employees

would not be making the most of its opportunities were an outside union voted
in. (3) Each employee was free to vote as he desired without fear of any
discrimination.
"I1n re Clark Bros., cited supra note 7, at p. 3 of the opinion; italics added.
1, The Board's emphasis on the employer's economic control is expressed in
THIRD ANNUAL REPORT

OF

NATIONAL

LABOR

RELATIONS

BOARD

(1938)

125:

"Activities, innocuous and without significance, as between two individuals economically independent of each other or of equal economic strength, assume enormous significance and heighten to proportions of coercion when engaged in by the
employer in his relationship with his employees. See National Labor Relations
Board v. Falk Co., 102 F. (2d) 383 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) . Contra: National
Labor Relations Board v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F. (2d) 905 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940);
cert.5 denied, 312 U. S. 689 (1941).
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §158
(1) (1940
ed.).Labor Relations Board v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F. (2d)
National
993 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S.768 (1943).
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and Power Co.1 definitely affirmed the employer's constitutional right
to express his opinion on labor matters when such utterances fall short
of coercion, either standing alone or when viewed in the totality of the
employer's conduct. Expressly relying on this decision, Judge Learned
Hand of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of American
Tube Bending Co.18 reversed the Board's finding of unfair labor practice under Section 8, Subsection 119 where the facts were practically
identical with those of the principal case.20 The Board's petition for
certiorari,"advancing many of the identical arguments advanced in this
case" 2' was denied.
2. Admitting that the denial of certiorariwas not necessarily conclusive, he argued that all doubt on the point was dissipated when in
the next term in the case of Thomas z. Collins,22 the Supreme Court,
noting with approval the American Tube Bending ruling, held unconstitutional a state statute requiring registration by union organizers, and
"made it clear that the right to make arguments for or against unions
was fully privileged by the First Amendment, and that 23it applied to
employers as well as to employees and union organizers.
3. Recently there has been a "disturbing tendency of the Board to
1 314 U. S. 469 (1941) (remanded for further finding) ; 319 U. S. 533 (1943)
(Board
order affirmed).
18
N. L. R. B. v. American Tube Bending Co., cited supra note 16.
19
NATIONAL LADR RELATIONS Acr, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §158
(1) (1940 ed.)..

Board Member Reilly dissenting in the principal case, In re Clark Bros., 70
N. L. R. B. No. 60 (1946), at p. 9 of the opinion, discusses the American Tube
Bending case with these words: "In this case an employer on the 4ve of an election
had assembled his employees during working hours to listen to a paper which he
read advising them against voting for a union in the coming election. The text
of this speech contained arguments implying that outside organizers were insincere
in their expressed solicitude for the welfare of the employees. It is implied that
the company would never sign a closed-shop agreement, and appealed to the
employees who wished to continue the friendly relationship which existed between
themselves and the company to vote for the employer (that is, vote '1o') rather
than for the union."
'Id. at p. 9 of the opinion Board Member Reilly dissenting: "For example,
the compulsory audience feature and the superior economic power feature were
points (1) and (2) in the Board's brief."
22323 U. S. 516 (1945).
Mr. Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority,
says: ".

.

. Short of that limit [coercion] the employer's freedom cannot be im-

paired. . . . Of course the espousal of the cause of labor is entitled to no higher
constitutional protection than the espousal of any other lawful cause.' 323 U. S.
516, 538 (1945). Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Murphy joined Mr. Justice
Douglas in a concurring opinion emphasizing that the court's previous cases dealing with the employer's freedom of speech were in harmony with those concerning
labor's right of free speech. 323 U. S.516, 543 (1945). Mr. Justice Jackson in
a separate concurring opinion stated: "Labor is free to turn its publicity on any
labor oppression, substandard wages, employer unfairness, or objectionable working conditions. The employer, too, should be free to answer, and to turn publicity
on the records of the leaders or the unions which seek the confidence of his men.
... We are applying to Thomas a rule the benefit of which in all its breadth and

vigor this Court denies to employers in the National Labor Relations Board cases."

323 U. S. 516, 547 (1945).

"'Inre Clark Bros., cited supra note 7, at p. 9 of the opinion, Board Member

Reilly dissenting.
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return to its old line of decisions on the theory that because there is
some minor aspect of interference, a speech should be viewed as part
of a 'pattern of coercive conduct.'...,24
4. While the courts, in the Virginia Electric and American Tube
Bending Co. cases,2 5 repudiated the earlier Board doctrine of employer
neutrality, they did not repudiate any doctrine that the employer "did
not have access to public media of expression," for no prior Board
decision had dealt with the captive audience situation.
5. "Granted that this company, like most industrial concerns, has
greater economic power than its own employees, such an analogy, when
referring to an election contest undertaken by one of the most powerful
'26
CIO unions, is fallacious.
Before analyzing the merits of the contentions of the majority and
dissenting Board members in the principal case, it will prove of value
to note the only federal court decision in point at the date of this writing:
27
National Labor Relations Board v. Montgomery Ward and Co.
decided in October, 1946, two months after the Clark Brothers case. This
case disagrees with the result reached in the principal case. The facts
were these: The Board petitioned the court for enforcement of an
order 28 entered by it requiring the company to cease and desist from
alleged unfair labor practices, to offer reinstatement with back pay to
certain discharged employees, and to post appropriate notices. The
Board found that the respondent had violated Section 8(1) of the
Act29' by (a) certain discriminatory discharges, (b) by certain anti-union
isolated remarks made by minor supervisory employees over a fifteen
months period, and (c) by speeches delivered a week before the election
by the company's Labor Relations Manager to captive audiences on
respondent's time and property. The speaker stated that a libel suit
had recently been filed by the company against the CIO for certain false
propaganda; that the company was unalterably opposed to the closed
shop; that each employee was free to join the union; and that the
respondent "stands ready at all times to bargain collectively with any
union which has been selected by a majority of the employees in any
0
bargaining unit.13

1,

Id. at p. 10 of the opinion, Board Member Reilly dissenting, citing In re
Goodall Company, 68 N. L. R. B. 31 (1946); and In re Monumental Life Insurance Co., 67 N. L. R. B. 35 (1946).
N. L. R. B. v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., and N. L. R. B. v. American
Tube Bending Co., cited supra notes 17 and 16 respectively.
" In re Clark Bros., cited supra note 7, at p. 11 of the opinion, Board Member
Reilly dissenting.
227157 F. (2d) 486 (C. C. A. 8th, 1946).

itre Montgomery Ward and Co., Inc., 64 N. L. R. B. 80 (1945).

LABOR RiELArios ACT, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §158 (1).
"N. L. R. B. v. Montgomery Ward and Co., cited supra note 27 at 498. The
full text of the speech is not appended to the opinion, but may be found more fully
set out in the report of the Board, cited supra note 28.
"TiONAL
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The court found (1) that the discharges were for good cause and
not discriminatory ,3 (2) that the remarks of the supervisory employees
were to be regarded as their individual views "'when, as here, an employer has clearly defined his attitude of noninterference ... ,'132 and
(3) that, therefore, the speech was to be considered only in the light of
the captive audience situation, and when so considered it was constitutionally privileged by the First Amendment. The Board's argument that
compulsory attendance at the meetings was a species of coercion was
rejected by the court with these observations: (1) The employer certainly has the "right to meet... employees for discussion and presentation of matters of policy of mutual interest" -33 (2) the First Amendment
is concerned with the freedom of thought and expression of the speaker
or writer, not with the condition under which the auditor receives the
message. Thus, the permission of the audience is not a condition precedent to the right of free speech under the First Amendment; (3)
"speech is very frequently invoked as a means to persuade those who
do not agree with the speaker and may not even wish to hear him" a3
(4) respondent employed a convenient means of communicating with its
employees; the employees were paid and not "inconvenienced in the
least"; (5) "free speech is not limited to ineffective speech"; (6) the
occasion on which the employer elects to utter his thoughts is not to be
considered as an element of coercion."3 5
It is submitted that the court's second statement as listed above
makes an unwarranted assumption. That is, that the speech in its full
setting is privileged and that the desire of the listeners to receive the
information is of no importance. Thus, a speech privileged in the theater
does not lose that protection because the audience desires not to hear
certain remarks. But before we may reach this conclusion as to the
constitutional protection of the speech we must first consider the conditions under which the auditor hears the speech as an element in determining its constitutional protection.
If "interference, restraint or
"I
2 N. L. R. B. v. Montgomery Ward and Co., cited supra note 27, at 496.
Id.at 501, quoting National Labor Relations Board v. Brandeis and Sons,
145 F. (2d) 556, 567 (C. C. A. 8th, 1944).
"' Id. at 499. Cf. Texas and New Orleans R. R. v. Brotherhood of Railway
Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 568 (1930), where the court said: "The meaning of the
word 'influence' [replaced in the Wagner Act by the word "interference"] . ..
is not to be taken as interdicting the normal relations and innocent communications
which are a part of all friendly intercourse, albeit between employer and employee."
" N. L. R. B. v. Montgomery Ward and Co., cited supra note 27, at 499.
35 Id. at 499. 'Certainly the Board interpretation that the privilege of an utterince is to be determined in its context would refute this conclusion. See note 6
supra. So likewise would the reasoning of the court in the Virginia Electric case,
cited supra note 20.
"' See the statement of Judge Learned Hand in National Labor Relations Board
v. Federbush Co., 121 F. (2d) 954, 957 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) where it is said:
"Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence, and not only does the meaning of each impenetrate the other, but all in
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coercion" of employees is forbidden by the Act and if the courts hold
that coercion, whether by acts, utterances or a combination of both, is
not privileged"9 by the First Amendment, then the question becomes,
Is the captive audience labor speech a form of coercion? To use this
factual approach to the problem would seem preferable to the doctrinaire
40
approach used by the court in the Ward case.
Reverting to the Clark Brothers decision 4 ' let us examine the several
arguments there advanced by the Board.
First, the argument of the majority in the Clark case that the
American Tube Bending42 decision did not decide this particular issue
concerning a captive audience appears to be inaccurate. In that case
Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the court, held that a letter sent to
the employees a few days before an election and a speech 3 delivered to
a captive audience the night before the election in which the employer
expressed his favoritism for an open shop, and appealed to the workers
to support the management's policies did not constitute interference,
restraint, and coercion in light of the Virginia Electric case. 44 It may
be true, that, as the Board says, the question of the employer's captive
audience speech was not presented to the court as an independent finding of the Board; yet, in harmony with the Board's own views that
utterances do not stand alone but must be considered in their context,
the court evidently viewed the question of the constitutionality in its
whole setting, captive audience and all: "... . it is necessary also to give
the setting in which they [the speech and letter] were uttered ....
The
speech... was read by the president... on the eve of the election to

three shifts of employees assembled in the factory.

. . .

"4

Then, so as

to leave no doubt, the court states: "The question may be divided into
two parts: first, whether the statements in the letter and the speech
uttered at that time and under those circumstances could be regarded as
coercive at all [and if coercive were they privileged under the First
Amendment]. ' ' 46 The effect of the captive audience upon the question
their aggregate take their purport from the setting in which they are used, of
which the relation between the speaker and the hearer is perhaps the most important part."

", NATiONAL

LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §158(1)

(19408 ed.).

Id. §151-166 (1940 ed.).

" National Labor Relations Board v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 314
U. S. 469 (1941).
"N. L. R. B. v. Montgomery Ward and Co., cited supra note 27.
,z In re Clark Bros. Co., Inc., 70 N. L. R. B. No. 60, 18, 1360 LAB. Rar. REP.
(1946).
"N. L. R. B. v. American Tube Bending Co., cited supra note 16.
"The speech is discussed in footnote 20 supra.
"N. L. R. B. v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., cited supra note 17.
"N. L. R. B. v. Aierican Tube Bending Co., cited supra note 16, at 994.

,LIbid.
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of the coercive nature of the speech surely seems to have been considered by the court as a part of the "time and circumstances."
Another theory that the Board applies in the principal case, namely,
that by the use of compulsion the employer obtained "exclusive access
to its employees" 47 during working hours, may actually have been true.
However, its significance must be measured in the light of the opportunities that organized labor has to present its case to the employees.
For example, the employer is forbidden to prohibit union solicitation
and activities on company property during non-working hours. 48 And
as Board Member Reilly points out in his dissent, a powerful industrial
union, as was there involved, has as much if not more ecnoomic power
to influence the election than does the average industrial concern. 49
One of the Board's principal justifications for finding interference,
restraint, and coercion in the captive-audience speech is that the captive
aspect of the audience was separable from the speech as such.50 This
idea is found in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in
Thontas v. Collins51 where he said:
"And if the employees or organizers associate violence or other offense against the laws with labor's free speech, or if the employer's
speech is associated with discriminatory discharges or intimidation, the
constitutional remedy would be to stop the evil, but permit the speech,
if the two are separable; and only rarely and when they are inseparable
52
to stop or punish speech or publication.1
The Board's conclusion on this point is in accord-with the rule of
Budd Mfg. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board53 where a prior antilabor attitude once purged was not allowed to subsequently form the
context for an anti-labor speech.
"In re Clark Bros., cited supra note 7, at p. 3 of the opinion.
"Republic Aviation Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 142 F. (2d)
193 (C.C. A. 2d, 1944), affirmed, 324 U. S. 793 (1945) ; National Labor Relations
Board v. Le Tourneau Co. of Georgia, 143 F. (2d) 67 (C.C. A. 5th, 1944), reversed, 324 U. S. 793 (1945).
"In re Clark Bros., cited supra note 7, at p. 11 of the opinion.
"In re Clark Bros., cited supra note 7, at p. 3 of the opinion.
52323 U. S. 516 (1945).

"Id.

at 547.

Cf. Milk Wagon Drivers Unions of Chicago, Local 753 v.

Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S. 287, 132 A. L. R. 1200 (1940); Nann v.
Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 147 N. E. 690, 73 A. L. R. 669 (1931) (opinion by Judge
Cardozo).
so 142 F. (2d) 922 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944). Cf. National Labor Relations Board v.
,Reliance Mfg. Co., 143 F. (2d) 761 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944); National Labor Relations Board v. American Laundry Machinery Co., 152 F. (2d) 400 (C. C. A. 2d,
1945) ; National Labor Relations Board v. American Manufacturing Co., 132 F.
(2d) 740 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943) ; National Labor Relations Board v. M. E. Blatt
Co., 143 F. (2d) 268 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 744 (1944).
BARGAINING (supplement
See also 2 TELLER, LABOR DispuTrs AND CoLzcnivr
1946) §252, n. 60j.
For a discussion of the rule against prior restraint of freedom of speech as
decided in the leading case of Near v. Minnesota, see Notes (1931) 31 CoT. L. Rv.
1148; 17 CORN. L:. Q. 126; 40 YAta L. Q. 967, 968.
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Previous to the Clark Brothers case numerous captive audience
situations came before the Board and courts, but the issue of captive
audience plus an otherwise privileged speech was never independently
dealt with. They are valuable, however, to show the Board's reasoning
on the captive audience situation. The results reached, in general,
were that the speeches were either (1) coercive and unprivileged per
se,54 (2) coercive because of a background of other unfair practices,55
or (3) privileged. 56 The first classification, coercive per se, is illustrated by the case of In re Tdin City Milk Producers Association"
where the Board found the employer's speech coercive on its face, and
said:
"Delivered in a setting where the listeners were economically dependent upon, and compelled to give heed to, the speaker, the whole tenor
of the speech [was coercive] ."58
The case of In re Thompson Products, Inc.,59 illustrates the Board's
view where a speech is delivered to a captive audience and raised to
the position of coercion by other conduct. The Board in that case said:
"In view of the economic dependence of the listeners upon [the
company] . . . and in view of the compulsion upon the listeners to give
heed, the adjurations... passed from the realm of free competition of
ideas envisaged by the First Amendment. When viewed against the
general atmosphere of hostility to outside unions engendered by publications, [the speeches] were bound . . . to interfere with the free choice
of the employees."6' 0 The election was set aside.
The case of In re Oval Wood Corp.61 illustrates the third holding
of the Board in the past captive audience cases. Here the employer on
the eve of the election contrasted the negative aspects of union membership with the company's past generosity, and questioned the assistance
of "total strangers." The Board concluded that the speech was privileged, saying:
' Cases in this category are: In re Pioneer Electric Co., 70 N. L. R. B. 59
(1946); In re Van Raalte, Inc., 69 N. L. R. B. 1326 (1946); In re Twin City
Milk Producers Association, 61 N. L. R. B. 69 (1945) ; National Labor Relations
Board v. Luxuray, Inc., 123 F. (2d) 106 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941). See note 5 supra.
" In re Jordanoff Aviation Corp., 69 N. L. R. B. 1189 (1946) ; In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 67 N. L. R. B. 244 (1946); In re Winona Knitting Mills,
Inc., 67 N. L. R. B. 1 (1946) ; In re Grove Regulator Co., 66 N. L. R. B. No. 135
(1946) ; In re H. Linsh and Co., 62 N. L. R. B. 276 (1945) ; In re Thompson
Products, Inc., 60 N. L. R. B. 1381 (1945); National Labor Relations Board v.
Quality Service Laundry Co., 131 F. (2d) 182 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942), cert. denied,
318 U. S. 775 (1943) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Sunbeam Electric Mfg.
Co., 133 F. (2d) 856 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943). See note 6 supra.
" Cases in this category are: In re Republic Drill and Tool Co., 66 N. L. R. B.
No. 96 (1946) ; In re Oval Wood Dish Corp., 62 N. L. R. B. 1129 (1945) ; Diamond T Motor Car Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 119 F. (2d) 978
(C. C. A. 7th, 1941). See note 11 supra.
8Id. at 83.
' 61 N. L. R. B. 69 (1945).
In re Thompson Products, Inc., 60 N. L. R. B. 1381 (1945).
"-62 N. L. R. B. 1129 (1945).
"Id. at 1386.
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"... . the respondent made no threat ... and coupled its statement
of preference with clear expressions assuring the employees that [he]
would not resort to reprisal to retaliate against any exercise of any
right guaranteed in the Act. Under the doctrine of the American Tube
Bending case, such conduct fell within the guaranty of free speech and
is not a violation of the Act."'0 2 From a reading of the previous capfive audience cases this conclusion seems warranted: The significance
attached by the Board to the coercive element in the captive audience
sitution has thus run the whole gamut. The reasoning of the Clark
Brothers case0 3 is at best difficult to reconcile with that of a case like
Thompson Products decision6 4 and is completely at odds with such a
view as taken in the Oval Wood Corp. case. 5
The Board's finding that the captive audience as a fact added the
element of coercion to an otherwise presumably privileged speech would
not seem in keeping with (1) the extent to which Congress apparently
intended that the employer should be allowed to speak to his employees
on organizational matters, and (2) extensive constitutional protection
to language given by the First Amendment. As to (1), above, it clearly
appears that Congress was aware of the judicial interpretation of the
Railway Labor Act (the legislative forerunner of the Wagner Act), as
to the clause used therein "interference, influence, and coercion," 66 and
being cognizant of such interpretation intended to extend its liberal application even further in the Wagner Act as regard to the employer's
right to speak on labor matters.67 As to (2), above, the recent Supreme
2
0 Id.at 1138.
6'Cited supra note 7.
e'Cited supra note 59.
"RAILwAY LABoR ACT, 44
8T

STAT.577

'5 Cited supra note 61.
(1926), 45 U. S. C. §152 (1940).

The Supreme Court in Texas and New Orleans R. R. v. Brotherhood of
Railway and Steanship Clerks, 281 U. S.548 (1930), had interpreted the Railway
Labor Act Section, which stated: "Representatives for the purposes of this Act,
shall be designated by the respective parties . . . without interference, influence
or coercion exercised by either party over the self-organization of representatives
by the other,"

(RALmwAY

LABOR AcT OF 1926, 44 STAT. 577 §2(3) (1926), 45

U. S. C. §152 (1940)), as meaning: ". . 'Interference' with freedom of action
and 'coercions refer to well understood concepts of law. ...
'Influence' in this
context 'plainly means pressure, the use of authority or power of either party to
induce action by the other in derogation of what the statute calls 'self-organzation.' The phrase covers the abuse of relation or opportunity so as to corrupt or
override the will... " Texas and New Orleans R. R. v. Brotherhood, supra at
568, italics added.
Before the Senate Comnmittee on Education and Labor on S. 1958 (SEN. REP.
No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935)) which eventually became the National
Labor Relations Act, Senator Walsh, its Chairman, explained the omission of
the word "influence": "I do not think there is anything in this bill to prevent an
employer.., from posting a notice, or writing. . . or personally stating to each
[employee] that he thinks their best interest is to form a company union ...that
he is violently opposed to [some organizer] who is attempting to organize a union
...that is why we struck out the word 'influence."
See Salny, "Free Speech" Under the National Labor Relations Act (19401941)

LAW Soc. JouRaAL,

REv. 59, 78.

414, 425.

See also note: (1945)

14 FoRDHAm LAw
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Court decisions of Thomas v. Collin, and Thornhill v. Alabama 0 on
the closely parallel situation of the employee's freedom of speech in picketing and other labor matters would seem to indicate that the Board's
narrow construction of what constitutes coercive speech in the principal
case is not in harmony with the constitutional protection extended labor's
activities.7 0
Admittedly, the constitutional protection to speech is not an absolute
one.71 One may not under the guise of free speech falsely shout fire
in a theater. 72 Nor may one speak or publish obscene matter where
prohibited by statute.7 3 The advocacy of violence or unlawful means to
accomplish a political result may be constitutionally prevented.7 4 Likewise, in the field of economic competition Congress may impose limitations upon utterances which by their coercive nature actually deprive
employees of their right of collective bargaining. But it is submitted
that the definition of interference, restraint or coercion 75 can only be
68

68

323 U. S. 516 (1945).

'9 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
The court has used language in this case and the
Thornhill case, cited supra note 68, which might indicate an unwillingness to follow the Board's restricted interpretation of the constitutional protection extended
the employer's speech in the Clark Brothers case, cited note 7 supra. For example
consider these statements:
"The idea is not sound therefore that the First Amendment's safeguards are
wholly inapplicable to business or economic activity.
. . . in the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free
discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution. . . . The right thus to discuss,
and inform people concerning, the advantages and disadvantages of unions and
joining them is protected. .. as part of free speech....
. whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at
appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or
impending. Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation. It is, therefore, in our tradition to allow the
widest room for discussion, the narrowest range for restriction." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530-532 (1945).
"Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion can be justified only where the
clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of
public opinion.", Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 104 (1940).
10 Other cases giving extensive protection to picketing under the First Amendment are: American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941) ; Carlson
v. California, 310 U. S. 106 (1940). Cf. Carpenters and Joiners Union of America,
Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722 (1940) ; Milk Wagon Drivers Union
of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S. 287 (1941).
See Teller, Picketing and Free Speech (1942-43) 56 HAv. L. RLv. 180, for
an excellent argument opposing the inclusion of picketing under the protection of
the First Amendment. The opposite view is taken in an able presentation by
Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent (1942-43) 56 HARV. L. REv. 513.
71

Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204 (1919), where the statement is

made that the First Amendment "cannot have been, and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for every possible use of language."
72 "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic." Schenck v. United States,
249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919).
=' Williams v. State, 130 Miss. 827, 94 So. 882 (1923).
7'
Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925).
75
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 49 STAT. 449 (1935) 29 U. S. C. §158(1)
(1940 ed.).
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extended to the point, as applied to utterances, where there is clear and
present danger 76 that such utterances unless restrained will deny the
employees rights guaranteed by the Act.77 From the words of one
court it would appear that all speech by the employer is protected "unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may
'78
befall before there is opportunity for full discussion.
Undoubtedly, a privileged speech delivered to a captive audience
under certain unusual circumstances and over objections of the employees might clearly constitute coercion and thereby lose its constitutional protection. But the Board's finding as a fact that a speech,
regardless of its privileged nature standing alone, delivered to a captive
audience thereby becomes coercive and ceases to be privileged seems an
unwarranted denial of freedom of speech and a departure from the
traditional interpretation of the First Amendment.
LENNOX P. McLENDON, JPR.

Federal Income Taxation-Dividend IncomeAccvual Accounting
In July, 1946, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seve*nth Circuit
in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. American Light and
Traction CompanyL held that a dividend declared in 1937 to stockholders
of record at specified date in December, 1937, and payable in January,
1938, was taxable as income in 1938, when paid in 1938, regardless of
whether the stockholder was on an "accrual basis" or on a "cash basis."
The court concluded that the date of actual receipt, and not the date of
declaration, determined the taxability of the income. 'The commissioner's contention throughout that the "record date" should be controlling
brought no comment from the court other than that this was the first
time such a theory had been urged.
The cases on this precise point are few. The decision in the principal case followed primarily that of Tar Products Corp. v. Commissioner2 decided in September, 1942, which had overruled a Board of Tax
"The "clear and present danger" test as generally applied by the courts in
freedom of speech cases was first used by Mr. Justice Holmes speaking for a
unanimous court in Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919). It has since
been used in a series of important cases: Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466 (1920)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ; Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U. S. 625 (1925)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927) (concurring opinion by Brandeis, J.); People v. Garcia, 37 Cal. App. (2d) 753, 98 P.
(2d) 265 (1939) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940). For more recent cases see note 70 supra.
"'49
STAT. 449 (1935) 29 U. S. C. §151-166 (1940 ed.).
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Mr. Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927).

1156 (F. (2d) 398 (C. C. A. 7th, 1946).
2130 F. (2d) 866 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1942).
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Appeals decision standing since 1927.3 Because of the Tar Products
decision, when the principal case arose in the Tax Court,4 that court
merely yielded to the decision of the circuit court of appeals and held
contrary to its former views, refusing to discuss the relative merits
of its own views and those of the circuit court of appeals.
In the two decisions placing all stockholders on the "cash basis" of
accounting with respect to dividend income for tax purposes,5 the courts
relied heavily on the commissioner's interpretation of Code Section
11 5 (a),6 which is set out in Regulation 1117 as follows: "A taxable
distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders shall be included
in the gross income of the distributees when the cash or other property
is unqualifiedly made subject to their demands." This regulation was
interpreted by both courts to apply alike to "cash basis" and "accrual
basis" stockholders for two reasons. First, because it had for many
years made no distinction between the two ;8 and second, because of the
commissioner's non-acquiescence in the Board of Tax Appeals decision
in 19279 which had allowed accrual of a dividend in the year of
declaration.
As to the first reason, it appears that the regulation, in addition to
having no binding effect,' 0 is more susceptible to the interpretation that
it applies only to a "cash basis" shareholder in order to prevent his
turning his back on income available to him so as to postpone its receipt
until the next year."' Moreover, the Revenue Act of 1921, Section
201(e), itself contained a similar provision, which was dropped from
the 1924. Act, and upon a review of the legislative history of Section
201(e) it was determined that it in effect was to prevent a "cash basis"
taxpayer from failing to report income unqualifiedly available to him,
though not actually received. But since it was thought this was the
rule which would be applied even in the absence of a statutory provision
it was stricken from the Act.' 2 It was thought, and reasonably so, that
this provision in Section 201(e) inspired the above regulation.' 3
' The circuit court of appeals decision in the Tar Products case reversed the

decision of the Board of Tax Appeals in 45 B. T. A. 1033 (1941), which had

followed its earlier decision on the same point in Campbell v. Commissioner, 6
B. T. A. 60 (1927).
"3 T. C. 1048 (1944).
Cited supra notes 1 and 2.
INTERNAL REVENUE CoDE,

§115(a), 26 U. S. C. A. §115(a).

"INCOmE TAx R_ uLATioNs 111, §29.115-1.

'The Regulations have used substantially identical language since 1921.
Campbell v. Commissioner, cited supra note 3.
"' However, its long standing without any change by Congress might be
deemed to give it the force and effect of law. See Helvering v. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 306 U. S. 110 (1939); Brown, Regulations, Reenactment, and the Revenue
Acts (1941) 54 HAiv. L. REv. 377.
See John A. Brander, 3 B. T. A. 231 (1925).
; see also Mary Miller Brax" Cecil Q. Adams, 20 B. T. A. 243, 245 (1930)
ton, 22 B. T. A. 128 (1931).
13 45 B. T. A. 1033, 1034, see note 3 supra.
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In relying on the second reason the courts are holding the commissioner to his contention made nineteen years earlier, and in effect are
giving more weight to the commissioner's opinion in the 1927 case than
to that of the Board of Tax Appeals. Consequently the courts are
reversing the authority which taxpayers have been following (or should
have been), and are holding in accordance with the commissioner's
former view, which he is here, in both cases, denouncing by asserting
his belief to be in accord with the former authority which held that the
dividend should be accrued by a shareholder properly reporting on the
"accrual basis". Accordingly it seems that the second reason given by
the court for its interpretation of the regulation is unsound.
In the application of the "single rule" the court in the principal case
(Commissirner v. American Light & Traction Co.) states additional
reasons. It says that it makes possible the checking of taxpayers' returns against the corporation record of disbursement. It must be con14
ceded that the information return required by Code Section 148(a)
serves the practical purpose of aiding the commissioner to check the
accuracy of shareholders' returns, but having the dividends reported on
the information return included by "accrual basis" shareholders in one
year and by "cash basis" shareholders in the next would not render the
information worthless-at most it would merely require the commissioner to use each information return partly for one year and partly for
the next.
Another reason given by the court is that application of the "single
rule" will prevent variations in the tax paid where dividends are paid
in kind and the value of the property fluctuates. However, it seems that
there should be no substantial objection to such a situation; but on the
contrary, it seems more desirable for the shareholder to report it in the
manner in which he reports the rest of his income and disbursements,
whether on the "cash basis" or "accrual basis," in order that the return
will more properly reflect his gains for the period. Practically speaking,
the tax paid by two shareholders on any particular dividend distribution
would probably not be the same even though they reported the income
in the same taxable year, and were holders of identical amounts of the
stock, because they would be in different income brackets and would
be affected differently by the same amount. But assuming for the sake
of example that their total taxable net incomes are the same, that they
are holders of an equal number of shares, and that tax rates applicable
to the two years are the same, then the "accrual basis" shareholder
would pay the same amount of tax on the dividend as the "cash basis"
11 "Every corporation shall, when required by the Commissioner, render a correct return, duly verified under oath, of its payments of dividends, stating the
name and address of each shareholder, the number of shares owned by him, and
the amount of dividends paid to him." 26 U. S. C. A. 148 (a).
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shareholder, except where the value of the stock distributed as a dividend fluctuated between the record date and the date of receipt. But
in view of the fact that the "acquisition value" to each shareholder
would be the market value upon which he had paid tax, and that this
value is the one upon which each would compute a gain or loss upon
selling or otherwise disposing of the stock, the objection to the difference in the tax paid on the distribution would seem to lose much of
its force. 15
Another reason given by the court is that a dividend is not taxable
unless paid out of earnings and the proportion of earnings to capital
used in paying cannot be determined until the date of payment in many
cases. As to this argument, it seems that it would be a rare situation
indeed in which the proportion of earnings to capital would not be
known by the paying corporation fairly close to the end of its operating
year (whether calendar or fiscal), and in consequence that information
would usually be available to the shareholders in ample time to record
as non-taxable income that portion of their dividend income attributable
to non-taxable distributions. 6
Finally the court reasoned that the dividend might be subject to
double taxation in the case of transfer of the stock from an "accrual
25 Suppose that a dividend in the stock of another company is declared Decem1, 1946, to stockholders of record December 15, 1946, payable January 10, 1947.
Suppose that on the record date (December 15) the market value of the stock
was $50, and by the payment date (January 10) the market value had fallen to
$45. Under these conditions the shareholder on the "accrual basis" would be taxed
on $50 and the shareholder on the "cash basis" on $45. Then suppose that both
sold these stocks on February 15, 1947, at which time they received the current
market value of $55 per share. Here the "accrual basis" shareholder who had
been taxed on $50 would have a taxable short term capital gain of only $5, where

the "cash basis" shareholder would have a taxable short term capital gain of $10.
Thus it can be seen that the total tax to each shareholder would tend to equalize,
and at the same time consistency in reporting income for tax purposes would be
preserved.
It is conceivable that this equalization would not follow as closely in the case
of a loss due to the sale in the example above, because of the maximum allowable
deduction for a short term capital loss (INTERNAL REVENUE CODE §117(d)). But,

conceding that in such cases the total tax of the two shareholders would not precisely equalize; nevertheless each taxpayer will more properly reflect his total
taxable gains if he is required to report all income (and expense) in a consistent
manner.
"Assuming for the sake of example that the declaring corporation operates
on the basis of the calendar year, the shareholders would normally have until
March 15 to file their returns, and certainly by the end of January the declaring
corporation will have been able to determine the proportion.
If the declaring corporation and the shareholder were operating on years ending at different dates (say June 30, and December 31), the situation would be
worse. However, the "single rule" cannot cure this situation because the shareholder's income will be taxable long before the end of the declaring corporation's
year.

But in view of the state statutes requiring that dividends may be declared only

from earnings (see 11

FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OP PRIVATE CORPORA-

§5329, and cases cited there in note 56) except in cases of liquidation, the
likelihood that the determination of the taxable proportion of a dividend will
present a major problem seems relatively slight.
TIONS
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basis" to a "cash basis" taxpayer between the record date and the date
of payment. Here it seems that since the stockholder of record, who is
the "accrual basis" stockholder in the court's example, would be the
one to whom the dividend check would be sent, that the sale subsequent
to the record date would have no effect, since this would ordinarily be
an ex-dividend transfer. Of course, where the sale, by agreement of
the parties, also transfers or assigns the dividend, the "accrual basis"
stockholder would be taxed on the dividend which he had assigned to
his vendee, but he would have received something by virtue of the sale
in consideration of the assignment of the dividend, and the difference
between the amount he received as consideration for the assignment
and the amount of the dividend would be reported as interest expense
(normally the dividend would be discounted) ; and the loss or gain on
the stock itself would be reported as a capital gain or loss. The vendee
"cash basis" stockholder should not be taxed because the dividend was
not income to him, but merely the consideration moving to him in the
contract, and for which he paid. Probably some small part of it would
be interest income (in the same amount as the vendor's interest expense)
and should be so reported. And so it can be seen that the courts' example of double taxation of one dividend would not materialize.
In the Tar Products case' 7 upon which the decision of the principal
case is based, the facts were for practical purposes the same; however, in
that case the commissioner was contending that the dividend should constitute taxable income to the distributee on the "accrual basis" in the
year of declaration; without mention of record date. In dealing with
the question as placed before it, the court, it is submitted, properly held
that the date of declaration of a dividend would not be a convenient
date on which to compel a taxpayer to accrue it. However, the court
went on to say "for he will never receive it unless he is also a shareholder upon the date when the books close, and that date is wholly subject to the corporation's convenience, not that of either the government
or taxpayer." Such reasoning overlooks the effect of a record date.
Once the record date is stated, and known, then the distributee can be
determined regardless of when the corporation closes its books, or
whether it closes them at all. Had the commissioner urged upon the
court in that case that the dividend should be accrued by the "accrual
basis" stockholder on the record date, it seems that the court's reasoning would have been more dearly shown to be unsound.
It is a fundamental concept in accounting that in order to accurately
reflect the position of a business, the income must be allocated to the
period when earned.' 8 It would seem to follow that where a definite
'T Cited supra note 2.
18 See Kzsrza, ADvANcED AccouNTUNG (3d rev. ed. 1933), p. 183.
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debtor-creditor relationship arises conclusively, the period when earned
would be determined for purposes of accruing. The courts have divided on the question of whether a corporate debt arises upon declaration of a dividend or whether it arises upon the record date.10 The
federal courts seem to favor the latter 2 0 Under either view it can be
seen that the debtor-creditor relationship does arise, with an absolute
right in the shareholder-creditor, at the latest, no later than the record
date; and it seems that under any view it would be proper to accrue
2
dividend income as of the record date. 1
It must be admitted that under the decision of the principal case,
there would be no accounting burden placed upon the "accrual basis"
shareholder in compelling him for tax purposes to report dividend income on a "cash basis"; it would merely be an item of an accounting
adjustment for purposes of filing the tax return. And it may be argued
that once this procedure is established that each year will balance out the
next in as far as the tax burden itself is concerned. However, it is
nevertheless frue that in order to accurately and properly reflect the income for a period, each item of income must be placed where the right
to it arose, and not the time of actual receipt. 22 The basic idea under
the accrual system is that the books shall immediately reflect obligations
and expenses definitely incurred and income definitely earned, regardless of whether payment has been made or is due. The word "accrue"
does not mean that the item is due in the sense of being then payable.
The accrual system wholly disregards due dates. 23
It has been argued that it would be impossible for stockholders to
accrue dividend income in the year of declaration, because very few
stockholders have reliable information as to when the declaration is
made.24 This argument is based on an excerpt from an accounting
handbook published in 1920,25 and it should be called to mind that such
information is much more readily available in 1946 than in 1920.20 Also
"9Declaration date: Ford v. Snook, 240 N. Y. 624, 148 N. E. 732; Beattie v.
Gidney, 99 N. J. Eq. 207, 132 At. 652; Western Securities Co. v. Silver King
Mining Co., 57 Utah 88, 113, 192 Pac. 664; Notes (1938) 27 GFORGETowN L. J.

74; Notes (1924) 38 HARv. L. REv. 245.

Record date: Smith v. Tacker, 133 Cal. App. 351, 24 P. (2d) 182; Richter &
Co. v. Light, 97 Conn. 364, 116 Atl. 600; Ford v. Ford Manufacturing Co., 222
Ill. App. 76, 84; Nutter v. Andrews, 246 Mass. 224, 142 N. E. 67.
See also Annotation 72 A. L. R. 982.
20 Sharp v. Commissioner, 91 F. (2d) 802 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937); Buchanan v.
National Savings & Trust Co., 23 F. (2d) 994 (App. D. C. 1928).
2tSee PATON, ADVAN CED ACCOUNTING (1941), p. 193.
22
Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U. S. 182 (1934).
2' Brown Co., 8 B. T. A. 112 (1927); see also Patrick McGuirl, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 F. (2d) 729 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
2" See dissenting opinion of Smith, Tar Products Corp. v. Commissioner, cited
supra
2 0 note 3.
MONTGOMm'S INCOME TAX PROCEDURE (1920), p. 450.
20 The larger newspapers devote whole sections to stock reports, and declarations

of dividends with the record dates are quoted therein. The, declarations of divi-
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it should be noted that this argument is aimed at not requiring an
accrual of the dividend income as of the date of declaration-aproposition with which the writer here agrees-but they are not considering
the accrual as of the record date. And in support of this very proposition the accounting authority referred to above as supporting the compulsory "cash basis" view,2 7 in commenting upon the 1927 decision, 28

recognizes the record date as controlling. 29 It should be further noted
that, assuming the information is not always immediately available, it
is not necessary to know of the directors' action at once in order to
accrue the income. Certainly the sooner the better, but it is simple and
common to accrue items long after they have arisen, but in time to get
them in the financial statements for the period.
A somewhat analogous situation to that in issue here, is the problem
arising upon the death of a stockholder, i.e., is the dividend income
taxable as income to the decedent or to his estatef In discussing the
proper accounting procedure applicable to this situation Professor Finney says, "dividends declared prior to decedents death are part of the
corpus, even though not collected, and those declared afterwards are
income to the estate."30 This accounting authority is placing the emphasis upon the declaration date which is earlier than the accrual date
urged in this article (except where declaration date and record date are
the same day), but the same principle is involved-that of allocating the
income to the proper period. The United States Supreme Court recently partially settled this question by determining that the date of
accrual of the dividend income was not the declaration date.3 1 The
court there expressly 2 did not decide whether the controlling date
should be the record date or the payment date; however, its clear analysis of the situation placed the record date as the date at which all
elements were present which are necessary for a propr accrual, i.e., the
payor, the amount, and the payee. With this view of the arising of a
complete debtor-creditor relationship, it seems highly probable that the
Supreme Court would hold the record date to be the proper date for
recognition of dividend income by a shareholder on the "accrual basis."
Considering that possibility, it is regrettable that the commissioner did
not ask for certiorariin the principal case.

dends by the more closely held corporations may never reach newsprint, but there
the shareholders are practically in constant touch with the corporation and would
normally be well informed. Also, any shareholder whose business enterprise is
large enough to justify accounting on the "accrual basis" (normally an individual
would be on the "cash basis") will easily be able to make it a point to know the
declaration and record dates of dividends on the stock he holds.
=
See note 24 supra.
"8See note 3 supra.
29
MONTGoMERY'S INcOME TAx PROCEDURE (1920), p. 294.
20
H. A. FINNEY, PmINcl'IEs OF ADVANCED AccouNTING (1946), p. 474.
Estate of Putnam v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 324 U. S. 393 (1945).
82 Id. at 398.
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It appears from a practical point of view, and from the standpoint of
making the law follow a natural course in allowing proper accounting
procedure, that the record date should control the point at which an
"accrual basis" shareholder must accrue his dividend income. A shareholder reporting all other income, and all disbursements, on an "accrual
basis" cannot, even for tax purposes, properly and accurately reflect his
income for a period so long as his dividend income is taxable as though
he were on the "cash basis."
It might be noted in closing that the holding in the principal case
is not objectionable to "accrual basis" shareholders having dividends
declared to stockholders of record on a date in 1946 and to be paid in
1947. With the "prospects" of lowered taxes for 1947, it is highly
desirable for everyone to postpone income until 1947, while at the same
time accruing as many expenses as possible for 1946. Should the tax
reductions not materialize for 1947, it would seem safe to say that at
least they will not be higher. However, this holding, though causing
possible bright outlooks for the present, may conceivably, when the
situation is reversed, cause an equal amount of hardship.
But under either situation, it is the consistency and logic of properly
reflecting income that is to be desired, and it is submitted that the holding of the principal case denies both when it places an "accrual basis"
shareholder, for tax purposes, partially upon a "cash basis."
WALTER E. BRock, JR.

